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INTRODUCTION: WHY ARE You HERE?
"Home," for me, is Ponce, on the island of Puerto Rico,' a United States
colony since 1898.2 No matter how far away from it I may go, my personal,
professional, and emotional travels always lead me back to Ponce.3  Yet, I have
made the ironic choice not to live in my country4 while it suffers from colonial
t Associate Professor of Law, The University of Florida Fredric G. Levin College of Law;
J.D., LL.M., Georgetown. I am grateful to my home institution for allowing me partially to use a Summer
Research Grant and a sabbatical to work on this article. I would like to thank Professors Steven W.
Bender and Keith Aoki for their work in LatCrit VII Symposium, Coalitional Theory and Praxis: Social
Justice Movements and LatCrit Community and for encouraging me to participate in it.
1. Puerto Rico is a group of islands. It is comprised of the main island, known as Puerto Rico,
and a series of smaller islands, including, but not limited to, Vieques, Culebra, Mona, and Monito. See 48
U.S.C. § 731 (1999). ("The provisions of this Act [48 USCS §§ 731 et seq.] shall apply to the island of
Puerto Rico and to the adjacent islands belonging to the United States, and waters of those islands; and the
name Puerto Rico as used in this Act shall be held to include not only the island of that name but all the
adjacent islands as aforesaid."). Unless otherwise expressly indicated, references to the isla or island
should be read as synonymous with all the Puerto Rican islands.
2. Puerto Rico is ceded to the United States by article II of the "Treaty of Peace Between the
United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain," which ended the Spanish-American War. See 1
P.R. LAWS ANN. 16 (1999); see also RACE AND RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A DIVERSE AMERICA
327 (Juan Perea et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter "RACE AND RACES"], citing 11 TREATIES AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1776-1949, at 615-19 (Charles 1.
Bevans ed., 1974). The editors of the Puerto Rico collection changed the references to "Porto Rico"
included in the original English version to "Puerto Rico." See I P.R. LAWS ANN. 17 (1999).
3. 1 was in Ponce when I wrote the initial drafts of this article.
4. Puerto Rico, with a combination of a definable territory and an identifiable culture that is
different from that of the colonial power (the United States), is a "cultural nation" that lacks sovereignty.
See generally Pedro A. Malavet, Puerto Rico: Cultural Nation, American Colony, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1
(2000). See also Mari Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law and Jurisprudence
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status.5 I shun the concept of a United States citizenship that is legally second-class6
and a Puerto Rican citizenship that lacks its own passport7  Therefore, I live in the
"states" where I can better seek the benefits of my statutory United States
citizenship.8  But due in part to that statutory citizenship and the prevalent white
racism in the United States,9 I am "othered"' and thereby rendered socially second-
class here.
for the Lost Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329 (1991) (describing "Radical Pluralism," a constitutional
right to cultural independence for U.S. citizens).
5. "Colony" is used in this article to refer to a polity with a definable territory that lacks
legal/political sovereignty because that authority is being exercised by a peoples that are distinguishable
from the inhabitants of the colony. See generally Malavet, Cultural Nation, supra note 4.
6. See Balzac v. People of Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922). The Supreme Court expressly
indicates that as long as they choose to remain on the island, Puerto Ricans, who are United States
citizens, will not enjoy the full rights of American citizenship. It thus distinguishes between Puerto
Ricans as individual United States citizens, and as collective inhabitants of Puerto Rico. As individuals,
they are free "to enjoy all political and other rights" granted U.S. citizens, if they "move into the United
States proper." Balzac, 258 U.S. at 311. But as long as they remain on the island, they cannot fully enjoy
the rights of United States citizenship. See also Guadalupe T. Luna, On the Complexities of Race: The
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and Dred Scott v. Sandford, 53 U. MIAMI L. REv. 691 (1999) (Dred Scott is
arguably the first of the "Insular Cases" in that it creates the Imperial United States, with its inherent
constructs of citizens and non-citizens within U.S. territorial control; Balzac then creates the categories of
citizenship, based on larger or lesser entitlements to the enjoyment of constitutional rights.); Adrienne D.
Davis, Identity Notes Part II: Redeeming the Body Politic, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 267, 272-73 (1997)
(detailing how Blacks were confined to second-class citizenship by U.S. Supreme Court opinions and
"totalitarian violence").
7. Puerto Rican citizenship is not internationally recognized. Therefore Puerto Ricans, as U.S.
citizens, travel abroad with United States passports. However, in an interesting, but sui generis case, the
Puerto Rico Supreme Court held that Puerto Rican citizenship existed independently from United States
citizenship, because of certain provisions of Puerto Rico law. Ramirez de Ferrer v- Mari-Bras, 144 P.R.
DEC. 141, 97 JTS 128 (1997). The opinion was issued on November 18, 1997, according to the published
text. Id. at 141. However, the day before the opinion was issued, Puerto Rico law was amended to
require both United States citizenship and Puerto Rico residency in order to be a citizen of the island. I
P.R. LAWS. ANN. § 7 (as amended by see. I of Law No. 132 of November 17, 1997); see also PEDRO
MALAVET-VEGA, INTRODUCCI)N AL CONSTITUCIONALIsMO AMERICANO 179 n.485 and accompanying
text (1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (the footnote discusses the controversy that
arose as a result of the rather curious timing of the amendment to the statute).
8. Article IX of the Treaty of Paris, which ended the Spanish-American War, provided, in
pertinent part: "The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded
to the United States shall be determined by the Congress." Treaty of Paris, Dec. 10, 1898, U.S.-Spain, art.
IX, T.S. No. 343, in RACE AND RACES, supra note 2, citing 11 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1776-1949, at 615-19 (Charles I Bevans ed., 1974).
In 1917, the Jones Act was approved by the U.S. Congress, and it designated Puerto Ricans as U.S.
citizens. See The Jones Act of 1917, ch. 145, 5, 39 Stat. 951,953 (1917) (conferring U.S. citizenship on
all "citizens of Porto Rico [sic]"). The Jones Act adopted the definition of Puerto Rican citizenship
included in the Foraker Act. See Foraker Act § 7, ch. 191, 31 Stat. 77, 79 (1900) ("That all inhabitants
continuing to reside therein who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and
ninety-nine, and then resided in Puerto Rico, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed
and held to be citizens of Puerto Rico, and as such entitled to the protection of the United States, except
such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain on or before the eleventh day
of April, nineteen hundred.").
9. See generally JOE R. FEAG1N & HERNkN VERA, WHITE RACISM IX (1995) ("In the United
States white racism is a centuries-old system intentionally designed to exclude Americans of color from
full participation in the economy, polity and society.").
10. In general, as used herein, "Other" and being "othered" mean to be socially constructed as
"not normative." See, e.g., Cathy J. Cohen, Straight Gay Politics: The Limits of an Ethnic Model of
Inclusion, in ETHNICrrY AND GROUP RIGHTS 580 (Will Kymlicka & [an Shapiro eds., 1997) ("Much of the
material exclusion experienced by marginal groups is based on, or justified by, ideological processes that
define these groups as 'other.' Thus, marginalization occurs, in part, when some observable characteristic
or distinguishing behavior shared by a group of individuals is systematically used within the larger society
[Vol. 13:387
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Unsympathetic and unapologetic imperialists might ask: "If the United
States is a racist imperialist nation, why, then, are you here?" Generally speaking,
an appropriate answer to the colonialist is: "Because you were there."' " And, in the
case of Puerto Rico it is more accurate to state: "Because you are there."' 2 I have
chosen exile13 partly because the estadounidenses (people of the United States) are
in Puerto Rico, and their presence deprives the Puerto Ricans of independent legal
citizenship and nationhood. Nevertheless, exile and my position as a member of the
legal academy in the Estados Unidos de Norteamrica (United States of North
America) offer me a unique opportunity to critique the legal and social constructs of
Puerto Rican citizenship in the United States.
14
The United States has continuously used Puerto Rico for various military
and private economic purposes during the more than one hundred years of its second
colonization.' 5 Nevertheless, in spite of United States citizenship, and because of
our social construction as a single non-white race, 6 all Puerto Ricans (on the island
to signal the inferior and subordinate status of the group.") citing ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON
THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY (1963). However, I will also use the term "Other" as a relative
term. See infra note 112 and accompanying text.
11. This response was articulated by Dinesh Khosla, a professor at CUNY Law School, during
his intervention in the Reparations Panel at the Seventh Annual LatCrit Conference (LatCrit VII) in
Portland, Oregon. See Program Schedule, LatCrit VII, available at http://personal.law.miami.edu/
~fvaldes/latcrit/lcviidoes/lcviiinvitation.htm (last visited September 29, 2002) (identifying scheduled
participants); see also Seventh Annual LatCrit Conference, Portland, Oregon, Plenary Panel It:
Reparations, Redress and Remedies: Undoing the Legacy of Colonialism and Imperialism [hereinafter
"Reparations Panel"], in Substantive Program Outline, available at http://personal.law.miami.edu/
-fvaldes/latcrit/lcviidocs/substantiveprogram.htm (last visited September 23, 2002) (detailed program
description).
12. The ongoing colonial relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States is discussed
further below. See infra Parts IIIA and IIIB; see also Malavet, Cultural Nation, supra note 4 (a detailed
analysis of the U.S.-Puerto Rico relationship).
13. I use the term "exile" advisedly. It is a political statement designed to underscore the
colonial reality of the U.S.-Puerto Rico relationship and that will hopefully help to subvert it. It reflects
the legal reality of the peoples of Puerto Rico who are deprived of sovereignty. See generally Malavet,
Cultural Nation, supra note 4. It also refers to the cultural/social construction of foreignness for the
Puerto Ricans in the United States, which I discuss further below. See infra note 176 and accompanying
text; see also Pedro A. Malavet, The Accidental Crit II: Culture and Looking Glass of Exile, 78 DENV. U.
L. REV. 753 (2001) [hereinafter "Malavet, Accidental Crit 11"] (describing the real and U.S.-manufactured
social constructs of the Puerto Ricans).
14. See generally Malavet, Accidental Crit II, supra note 13, at 758-63. While there is
substantial scholarship in Puerto Rico regarding status issues and the social construction of Puerto Ricans
by the United States, there is remarkably little of it in English-language legal scholarship.
What little scholarship exists is listed here. See, e.g., EFRN RivERA-RAMos, THE LEGAL
CONSTRUCTION OF IDENTITY: THE JUDICIAL AND SOCIAL LEGACY OF AMERICAN COLONIALISM IN
PUERTO RICO (2001); Ediberto Romin, The Alien-Citizen Paradox and Other Consequences of U.S.
Colonialism, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 n. 146 (1998); Jost TRiAS-MONGE, PUERTO RICO: THE TRIALS OF
THE OLDEST COLONY IN THE WORLD (1997); PUERTO RICAN JAM: RETHINKING COLONIALISM AND
NATIONALISM (Frances Negrrn-Muntaner & Ram6n Grosfoguel eds., 1997); Ediberto Roman, Empire
Forgotten: The United States's Colonization of Puerto Rico, 42 VILL. L. REV. 1119, 1137-38 (1997)
[hereinafter "Romtn, Empire Forgotten"]; Efrhn Rivera-Ramos, The Legal Construction of American
Colonialism: The Insular Cases (1901-1922), 65 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 225 (1996); JUAN R. TORRUELLA, THE
SUPREME COURT AND PUERTO RICO: THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL (1988); ARTURO
MORALES-CARRION, PUERTO Rico: A CULTURAL AND POLITICAL HISTORY (1983); Jose A. CABRANES,
CITIZENSHIP AND THE AMERICAN EMPIRE (1979).
15. This is discussed in Part IIIB. The Spanish colony was the first colony and the U.S.
colony is Puerto Rico's second colonial period or second colony. See generally Malavet, Cultural Nation,
supra note 4, at 12-45 (a history of the first colony, the Spanish colony, and a description of the historical
antecedents and legal consequences of the second colony).
16. This is discussed in Part IIC.
2002]
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or in the United States "proper") are considered too inassimilable 17 to become fully
"American."' 8 Moreover, the Puerto Ricans in Puerto Rico, in spite of their United
States citizenship, are deprived of full participation in the U.S. political process. The
island Puerto Ricans lack a congressional delegation and are not allowed to vote in
presidential elections.' 9 This lack of political participation and power within the
federal government-which I label a "democratic deficit"--leaves the residents of
the island relegated to a political and economic underclass within the United States.
This article primarily focuses on the plight of the Puerto Ricans on the
island because, in addition to their flawed social construction by the United States
and lack of national political power, they are also legally constructed as second-class
citizens. In defining the legal rights of Puerto Ricans, the U.S. Supreme Court has
held that territorial citizens are entitled to fewer constitutional protections than U.S.
citizens residing in any of the fifty states.20 The racist and essentialist 21 social
construction of the Puerto Ricans as inassimilable, the denial of legal rights by the
17. On the inassimilability of Puerto Ricans and Native Americans, see the discussion infra
note 167 and accompanying text. See also the discussion of the racialization of Puerto Ricans infra Part I.
On Latina/o assimilation in the United States generally, see Kevin R. Johnson, "Melting Pot " or "Ring of
Fire"?: Assimilation and the Mexican-American Experience, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1259 (1997) (a poignant
discussion of growing up Latina/o in California); George A. Martinez, Latinos, Assimilation and the Law:
A Philosophical Perspective, CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 1 (1999) (drawing analogies between American
demands of assimilation and insect biology and Star Trek's Borg characters).
18. See also the discussion of Balzac supra note 6 (the U.S. Supreme Court distinguishes
between Puerto Rican U.S. citizens and "Americans"). Except on this one occasion, in this article, I will
generally refer to the United States of America as such or as "United States" or simply "U.S." and to its
citizens as United States/U.S. citizens or estadounidenses, thus purposefully avoiding the imperialistic
appropriation of the terms "America" and "American" to describe only one nation and its citizens. Berta
Esperanza Hern~mdez-Truyol explains the irony of using the term "American" to refer only to citizens of
the United States of America:
I use the designation United States for the United States of America. Many, if not
most or all of the other authors use the terms United States and America
interchangeably. I decided not to alter the authors' choice of language in that
regard. I do find it necessary to comment thereon, however, because I find it ironic
that in a book on imperialism the imperialistic practice of denominating the United
States as "America" remains normative. Indeed, America is much larger than the
U.S. alone; there is also Canada [and Mexico] in North America, and all of Latin
America and the Caribbean (some locations commonly referred to as Central
America, some as South America).
Berta Esperanza Hemtndez-Truyol, Introduction, in MORAL IMPERIALISM: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY 15
n.5 (Berta Esperanza Hemdndez-Truyol ed., 2002).
19. This is discussed in Part IIA infra.
20. See supra note 6; see also the discussion in Part IIA.
21. "'Essentialist" means motivated by essentialism. "Essentialism adopts the view that all
members of a group are alike and share a common 'essence."' Sumi K. Cho, Essential Politics, 2 ILHRv.
LATINO L. REV. 433 n. I and accompanying text (1997) [hereinafter "Cho, Essential Politics"] As it is
used herein:
The concept of essentialism suggests that there is one legitimate, genuine universal
voice that speaks for all members of a group, thus assuming a monolithic
experience for all within the particular group-be it women, blacks, latinas/os,
Asians, etc. Feminists of color have been at the forefront of rejecting essentialist
approaches because they effect erasures of the multidimensional nature of identities
and, instead, collapse multiple differences into a singular homogenized experience.
Berta Esperanza Hemdndez Truyol, Latindia I-Latinas/os, Natives, and Mestizajes-Latcrit Navigation
ofNuevos Mundos, Nuevas Fronteras and Nuevas Teorias, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 851, 862 n.27 (2000)
(citations omitted). See also FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: FOUNDATIONS 335 (D. Kelly Weisberg ed., 1993)
(discussing gender essentialism); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42
STAN. L. REV. 581, 588 (1990) (discussing gender and racial essentialism).
[Vol. 13: 387
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courts, along with the democratic deficit which deprives those Puerto Ricans
presently living on the island of participation in national elections, constitute the
obstacles to full participation within United States society or to the establishment of
their own independent sovereignty.
This long history of marginalization has produced and continues to produce
serious harms. The best solution is the development of a postcolonial political
organization for the island. This article uses reparations theory to inform a transition
to a postcolonial Puerto Rico.
There are three very different legitimate postcolonial alternatives for a
relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States: (1) independence, (2) non-
assimilationist statehood, and (3) a constitutional bilateral form of free association.
22
I choose to focus on all three decolonization alternatives rather than my own
personal choice, independence. I do so because there is broad agreement among
Puerto Ricans regarding the current status of Puerto Rico as colonial. 23 Yet the
choice of a specific postcolonial solution from among the three listed above is a
deeply divisive issue among Puerto Ricans. 24 I have accordingly chosen to study
postcolonial organizations that fit within the three general postcolonial status
alternatives advocated by political parties in Puerto Rico.
The economic implications of all three status alternatives involve
expenditures by the colonial power, the United States, to compensate the colonized
people, the Puerto Ricans. These payments are essential both for the construction of
local political power for Puerto Ricans, and to create a viable Puerto Rican economy
that supports real equal opportunity for puertorriquehas y puerlorriquehos, thus
repairing the legacy of political, economic, and psychological colonization by the
United States. These legal changes and payments can be characterized as
reparations, as defined in contemporary critical jurisprudence. 5
I was very happy to be invited to develop and present some preliminary
thoughts about reparations scholarship as it relates to Puerto Ricans in the
"Reparations Panel" at LatCrit VII. This article memorializes my panel
22. 1 have identified and discussed why these are the only legitimate alternatives in a previous
article. See Malavet, Cultural Nation, supra note 4, at 96-102. 1 am currently working on a book that will
develop a model for the future, posteolonial legal relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States
in much greater detail. PEDRO A. MALAVET, PUERTO RICO: CULTURAL NATION, AMERICAN COLONY
(forthcoming NYU Press 2004). The basic remedial premises of the book are discussed infra notes 80-84
and accompanying text.
23. See, e.g., Trias-Monge, OLDEST COLONY, supra note 14, at 195-96 (an architect of the
Commonwealth concludes that "statehood, independence, or enhanced Commonwealth each have the
potential of' completing the "exasperating[ly] slow ... process of decolonizing Puerto Rico"); see also
the publications cited supra note 14.
24. See generally FERNANDO BAYRON-TORO, ELECCIONES Y PARTDOS POLiTICOS DE
PUERTO RICO (1989) (a comprehensive review of Puerto Rican political parties and general election
results from 1809 to 1988).
25. See, e.g., Mar J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations,
22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 323,362 (1987) [hereinafter "Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom"].
26. This Symposium volume memorializing the proceedings of the Seventh Annual LatCrit
Conference is the most recent installment in LatCrit scholarly discourse. There has been a symposium
issue for each of the annual LatCrit conferences and several other important meetings. See generally
LatCrit Vi Symposium, Latinas/os and the Americas: Centering North-South Frameworks in LatCrit
Theory, FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2003); LatCrit V Symposium, Class in LatCrit: Theory and Praxis in a
World of Economic Inequality, 78 DENV. U. L. REV. 467 (2001); LatCrit IV Symposium, Rotating Centers,
Expanding Frontiers: LatCrit Theory and Marginal Intersections, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 18 (2000);
LatCrit III Symposium, Comparative Latinas/os: Identity, Law and Policy in LatCrit Theory, 53 U. MIAMI
L. REv. 575 (1999); LatCrit II Symposium, Difference, Solidarity and Law: Building Latina/o
20021
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presentation and develops some further thoughts on the subject, based on the
discussion and research that followed the conference.
Part II of this article will explain how reparations discourse generally seeks
to negate the effects of racism and essentialized racial construction by the normative
(dominant) United States society. 27  The section engages the tensions between
LatCrit and certain mostly African-American Critical Race Theory (CRT) scholars
that led to the creation of LatCrit and shaped it as an aggressively coalitional,
welcoming form of outsider jurisprudence 28 in the critical tradition.2 9 It will also
discuss the purpose, importance, and qualifying factors of "centering" the Puerto
Rican condition in reparations discourse.
30
Part III of this article applies LatCrit theory3' to construct the meaning and
implications of reparations within recent Critical Race Theory32 and more broadly in
Communities Through LatCrit Theory, 19 CHICANO LATINO L. REV. 49 (1998); Miami Colloquium,
International Law, Human Rights and LatCrit Theory, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 177 (1997);
LatCrit I Symposium. LatCrit Theory: Naming and Launching a New Discourse of Critical Legal
Scholarship, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1 (1997); Preliminary Puerto Rico Colloquium, Representing
Latinalo Communities: Critical Race Theory and Practice, 9 LA RAZA L.J. I (1996). See also Symposium.
LatCrit Theory: Latinas/os and the Law, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1087 (1997), 10 LA RAZA L.J. 1 (1998) (this
was a "stand-alone" symposium, not directly connected to one of the LatCrit conferences or colloquia);
The First Annual Latcrit Summer Colloquium: Spain, the Americas and Latino/as: International and
Comparative Law in Triangular Perspective, 9 U. MIAMI INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 152 (2000/200 1).
27. "Normative" means the dominant societal paradigm, i.e., what is considered "normal" in a
given sociological context. See Berta Esperanza Herndndez-Truyol, Borders (En)gendered.
Normativities, Latinas and a LatCrit Paradigm, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 882 (1997) ("knowledge is socially
constructed," therefore, the "normative paradigm's dominance" defines "normal").
28. See Mari Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87
MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2323 (1989) ("outsider jurisprudence" is scholarship produced by and focused on
outsider perspectives, communities, and interests, i.e., going beyond the dominant group). Forms of
outsider jurisprudence include Critical Race Theory, LatCrit, Asian-American Legal Theory, Critical Race
Feminism, Feminist Legal Theory, and Queer Legal Theory. Francisco Valdds prefers the label "OutCrit"
theory to describe a broad, but perhaps more coalitional and praxis-oriented, form of outsider legal
scholarship. Francisco Valdrs, Theorizing "OutCrit" Theories: Coalitional Method and Comparative
Jurisprudential Experience--RaceCrits, QueerCrits and LatCrits, 53 MIAMI L. REV. 1265, 1270 n.21
(1999) [hereinafter "Vald6s, OutCrit Theories"].
29. As Francisco Valdis explains: "LatCrit theory follows and in some ways stems from the
historical experience with Critical Legal Studies, Feminist Legal theory, Critical Race theory, Critical
Race Feminism and Queer legal theory." Francisco Valdds, Poised at the Cusp: LatCrit Theory, Outsider
Jurisprudence and Latinalo Self-Empowerment, 2 HARV, LATINO L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1997) [hereinafter
"Valdes, Poised at the Cusp"]. Additionally, Critical Legal Studies (CLS) was the heir to American Legal
Realism and the unwitting catalyst for Critical Race Theory (CRT). See generally AMERICAN LEGAL
REALISM (William W. Fisher III et al. eds., 1993); MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL
STUDIES (1987) (providing background of CLS); Symposium: Critical Legal Studies, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1
(1984) (describing the movement and presenting examples of its scholarship); Comel West, Foreword,
CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT xi, xxii-xxvii (Kimberl
Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter "THE KEY WRITINGS"] (outlining background on initial
relationship and eventual split of CLS and CRT).
30. "The 'center' idea encompasses struggles about which issue, group and idea should be the
focus of attention in a given space, research project, conference, etc." Athena D. Mutua, Shifting Bottoms
and Rotating Centers: Reflections on LatCrit III and the Black/White Paradigm, 53 MIAMI L. REV. 1177
n.1 (1999), citing Trina Grillo & Stephanie M. Wildman, Obscuring the Importance of Race: The
Implications of Making Comparisons Between Racism and Sexism (and Other-Isms), 1991 DUKE L.J. 397,
402 (1991) (Mutua explains that these authors describe "the process whereby whites, in workshops
designed to discuss racial issues, re-center the discussion around themselves and issues of primary
concern to them, in this context, sexism.").
31. Francisco Valdis, one of the founders of this movement, explains:
LatCrit theory is [a] discourse that responds primarily to the long historical
presence and general sociolegal invisibility of Latinas/os in the lands now known as
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outsider jurisprudence. The article then uses the sophisticated analysis developed by
the existing reparations scholarship, viewed through a LatCrit lens, to construct an
initial inquiry into how reparations might inform the implementation of a
postcolonial status that empowers the people of Puerto Rico. Part III concludes by
explaining that the arguments developed in this article are expressly for the benefit
of the Puerto Ricans presently living in Puerto Rico. For they are legally and
socially marginalized to a higher extent than any other U.S. citizen, and even more
than persons of Puerto Rican descent who reside in the "United States proper."
Finally, Part IV of this article, occasionally using the problems generated by
the U.S. Navy's bombing of the Puerto Rican island of Vieques, applies LatCrit
theory, informed by reparations scholarship, to begin developing a proper
understanding of the Puerto Rico situation as it is relevant to the acquisition of
independent legal and economic sovereignty, or national power within the United
States, by the Puerto Ricans.
33
I.
ROTATING CENTERS IN THE REPARATIONS DISCOURSE:
THE SENSITIVE MATTER OF RACE
The normative culture in the United States socially constructs many
different non-white races who are supposedly "naturally" inferior relative to
the United States. As with other traditionally subordinated communities within this
country, the combination of longstanding occupancy and persistent marginality
fueled an increasing sense of frustration among contemporary Latina/o legal
scholars, some of whom already identified with Critical Race Theory (CRT) and
participated in its gatherings. Like other genres of critical legal scholarship, LatCrit
literature tends to reflect the conditions of its production as well as the conditioning
of its early and vocal adherents.
Francisco Valdes, Theorizing "OutCrit" Theories: Comparative Antisubordination Experience and
Subordination Vision as Jurisprudential Method, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: HISTORIES, CROSSROADS,
DIRECTIONS (forthcoming Yale University Press) (citations omitted), available at http://
personal.law.miami.edu/-fvaldes/latcritloverview.html (last visited June 6, 2002).
32. While definitions are often dangerous, if not impossible-see Francisco Valdes, Under
Construction: LalCrit Consciousness, Community, and Theory, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1087 n.2 (1997), 10 LA
RAZA L.J. 3 n.2 (1998) (noting that defining LatCrit is difficult)--I like this one:
Critical Race Theory is the most exciting development in contemporary legal
studies. This comprehensive movement in thought and life--created primarily,
though not exclusively, by progressive intellectuals of color--compels us to
confront critically the most explosive issue in American civilization: the historical
centrality and complicity of law in upholding white supremacy (and concomitant
hierarchies of gender, class, and sexual orientation).
West, Foreword, supra note 29, at xi. See also Angela P. Harris, Foreword: The Jurisprudence of
Reconstruction, 82 CAL. L. REV. 741 (1994) [hereinafter "Harris, Reconstruction"] (introduction to
symposium devoted entirely and specifically to Critical Race Theory).
33. This is necessarily an initial inquiry because I am still in the process of researching my
book, and am therefore not yet in a position to suggest (all) final conclusions illuminated by my
investigation. Nevertheless, the conference, my preparation therefor, and the work on this essay have
helped me to focus on the important issues in the postcolonial Puerto Rico paradigm.
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whites. 34 In this context, the Puerto Ricans are just one of many groups who are the
objects of racialization,35 as are Latinas/os in general 3 6
Initially, one might argue that the construct of Latina/o as a racial category
encompassing people of white, indigenous, and African heritage misses the point
that Latinas and Latinos are not a race, but rather a cultural/ethnic group
encompassing persons of many different races.37  To put it more simply,
phenotypically or anthropologically, some Latinas/os are white, black, indigenous,
Asian, Arab, or of mixed heritage. On the other hand, many Latinas/os embrace the
concept of a "sociedad o raza india, espahola y africana" (an Indian, Spanish, and
African society or race). 38 But, of course, these shifting constructions of Latinidad
(Latina/o-ness) only help to reinforce the LatCrit tenet that race is a social
construct,39 and as such varies according to who and how it is being defined.
40
Nevertheless, the racialization of Latinas/os as a single non-white race was
constructed to justify and reinforce our marginalization within the United States.
It is important to note that the social construction of a Latinalo "race" is
ultimately not primarily based on or motivated by ethnicity41 and xenophobia, but
34. See, e.g., TOMAS ALMAGUER, RACIAL FAULT LINES: THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF WHITE
SUPREMACY IN CALIFORNIA (1995) (a detailed analysis of racial construction of multiple ethnic groups-
including Mexicans, Asians, and Blacks-as subordinate to whites in California); see also Feagin & Vera,
WHITE RACISM, supra note 9.
35. Michael Omi and Howard Winant use the term "racialization to specify the extension of
racial meaning to a previously racially unclassified relationship, social practice or group." These authors
emphasize that "racialization is an ideological process, an historically specific one." MICHAEL OMI &
HoWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1980s, 61-62
(1987).
36. Puerto Ricans were racialized as non-white by the United States starting early in the
second colony. For example, during the congressional debate on the 1917 Organic Act for Puerto Rico,
United States Representative Joseph Cannon stated that "the racial question" made the Puerto Ricans
ineligible for statehood and made them suspect as "people competent for self-government." He supported
his argument with the following statistical analysis: "Porto Rico is populated by a mixed race. About 30
percent pure African.... 75 to 80 percent of the population.., was pure African or had an African strain
in their blood." RACE AND RACES, supra note 2, at 346. See also infra note 165 and accompanying text.
37. See, e.g., Gloria Sandrino-Glasser, Los Confundidos: De-Conflating Latinos/as' Race and
Ethnicity, 19 CHICANO-LATINO L. REv. 69 (1998) (arguing that "national origin" understanding of anti-
latina/o discrimination is superior to one based on "race"); see also Juan Perea, Five Axioms in Search of
Equality, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 231 (1997) (arguing that "ethnicity" is a superior concept to "national
origin" and "race" in understanding discrimination against Latinas/os in the United States).
38. This is a common image in Latin American popular culture. See, e.g., La Sonora
Poncena's song Descendencia (Being descended of) in the album "Birthday Party": "Somos latinos,
somos la esencia de Puerto Rico, quien me discute ese honor ... Orgulloso de mi cantar, latina, yo
siempre estoy ... Mezcla de espaiiol, africano y taino. " Author's translation: "We are Latinos, we are
the essence of Puerto Rico, who argues/challenges this honor? ... Proud of my singing, Latin, I always
am,... A Mixture of Spaniard, African, and Taino."
39. "Race is social, in the sense that the groups commonly recognized as racially distinct have
their genesis in cultural practices of differentiation rather than in genetics, which plays no role in racial
fabrication other than contributing the morphological differences onto which the myths of racial identity
are inscribed." Ian F. Haney-L6pez, Retaining Race: LatCrit Theory and Mexican American Identity in
Hernandez v. Texas, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 279, 281 (1997). See also L. LUCA CAVALLI-SFORZA ET
AL., THE HISTORY AND GEOGRAPHY OF HUMAN GENES (1994) (lack of biological basis for racial
categories); Ian F. Haney-L6pez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion.
Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1994).
40. See Berta Esperanza Hemindez-Truyol, Indivisible Identities: Culture Clashes, Confused
Constructs and Reality Checks, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 199, 207 (1997) (imposed social constructs are
dynamic and tend to change based on the racialized, gendered frame of reference of the actor).
41. Ethnicity includes "common geographic origin; migratory status; race; language or dialect;
religious faith or faiths; ties that transcend kinship, neighborhood and community boundaries; an external
[Vol. 13: 387
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rather by race and racism. This is not to suggest that ethnicity 42 and "foreigrness"4 3
are not a part of this construct, but rather to emphasize the phenomenon of the social
construction of race(s). Latinas/os are racialized as a mixed, non-white race which,
as in the case of African-Americans, results in our social marginalization.
'4
Developing consciousness about being the common victims of United
States racism4 5 has often produced more conflict than common ground internally
among Latinas/os 46 and, as this section engages, between Latinas/os and other
racialized groups, especially African-Americans.47 Because reparations discourse
has recently been strongly deployed by African-American scholars, the expansion of
perception of distinctiveness." HARVARD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN ETHNIC GROuPs VI (Stephen
Thernstrom ed., 1980).
42. LatCrit scholarship has noted how the social and legal construction of Latinas/os in the
United States is fundamentally a racialized process. For example, Ian F. Haney-L6pez explains that while
race and ethnicity are not
essentially different; on the contrary ... race and ethnicity are largely the same.
[But they] should not be conflated because these two forms of identity have been
deployed in fundamentally different ways. The attribution of a distinct ethnic
identity has often served to indicate cultural distance from Anglo-Saxon norms.
Left unstated but implicit, however, is a claim of transcendental, biological
similarity: ethnics and Anglo-Saxons are both White. The attribution of a distinct
racial identity, on the other hand, has served to indicate distance not only from
Anglo-Saxon norms, but also from Whiteness. Racial minorities are thus twice
removed from normalcy, across a gap that is not only cultural, but supposedly
innate.
Ian F. Haney-L6pcz, Retaining Race: LatCrit Theory and Mexican American Identity in Hemandez v.
Texas, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 279, 283 (1997).
43. LatCrit scholars have paid special attention to the social construction of "foreignness,"
with its inherent denial of "citizenship," that is often imposed on Latinas/os and other groups-such as
Asian-Americans-in the United States, despite our legal citizenship. See Neil Gotanda, Asian-American
Rights and the "Miss Saigon Syndrome, " in ASIAN-AMERICANS AND THE SUPREME COURT 1096 (Hyung-
Chan Kim ed., 1992) (In "the United States, if a person is racially identified as African-American or
white, that person is presumed to be legally a U.S. citizen and socially an American. . . . [But] these
presumptions are not present for Asian-Americans, Latinos, Arab-Americans, and other non-Black racial
minorities. Rather, there is the opposite presumption that these people are foreigners; or, if they are U.S.
citizens, then their racial identity includes a foreign component."); Juan Perea, Los Olvidados: On the
Making of Invisible People, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 965, 966 ("Latino invisibility" defined as "relative lack of
positive public identity and legitimacy" caused by our "foreign" ethnicity). Language has also been an
important theme in LatCrit scholarship. See, e.g., Juan F. Perea, Demography and Distrust: An Essay on
American Languages, Cultural Pluralism, and Official English, 77 MINN. L. REV. 269 (1992) (analyzing
"official English" legal proposals); Steven W. Bender, Direct Democracy and Distrust: The Relationship
Between Language Law Rhetoric and the Language Vigilantism Experience, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV.
145, 146 (1997) (discussing "Language Vigilantism," how "individuals speaking a language other than
English [mostly Latinas/os] have increasingly come under attack [from normative Anglos] in their
schools, their workplaces, and even in their homes and places of leisure").
44. See generally Ian F. Haney-L6pez, Race and Erasure: The Salience of Race to LatCrit
Theory, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1143 (1997), 10 LA RAZA L.J. 57 (1998) (concluding, after extensive review,
that Latinas/os are racialized by the normative U.S. society and failing to treat this as racial construction
and racism will only result in an enforced erasure of Latina/o issues from public discourse and in
permanent marginalization of our group).
45. This article uses the phrase "United States racism" rather than "racism in the United
States," and "white racism" instead of "racism," to emphasize that white racism is an institutional,
constitutive element of the dominant white Anglo culture in the United States. Additionally, one can be a
victim of "United States racism."
46. See, e.g., Ediberto Ronn, Common Ground: Perspectives on Latino/Latina Diversity, 2
HARV. LATINO L. REV. 483, 484 (1997) ("1 am concerned over the amount of time and energy we spend
on our differences [as Cubans, Puerto Ricans, whites, blacks, men, women, heterosexuals, homosexuals,
Catholics, agnostics] as compared to the time and energy we spend acknowledging common ground.").
47. See the discussion infra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
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the discourse to cover other racialized non-white groups must be undertaken with
sensitivity to the claims articulated by other groups.
Accordingly, the Reparations Panel was described in the Substantive
Program Outline for LatCrit VII as follows:
The term "reparations" has recently become synonymous with the
struggle of African-Americans to obtain the payment of damages
from governments that perpetrated the immoral crimes of slavery,
especially from the government of the United States. While this
panel will address this issue, it also seeks to expand the discourse
to include the plight and efforts of all the victims of United States
imperialism .... [T]he "Reparations Panel" will center a variety
of progressive social movements within an expanded definition of
reparations and within LatCrit theory and praxis.48
Like fellow LatCrit scholar Robert Westley-an expert on reparations for
African-Americans 49  I deploy a comparative study of reparations to set a moral,
and sometimes legal, precedent for other claims of reparations. This is not intended
to develop a "comparative victimology" which divides marginalized groupsi ° The
movement in favor of the decolonization of Puerto Rico is simply one of many
"progressive social movements" that seeks to undue the legacy of U.S. imperialism.
However, looking at the problem of the Puerto Ricans in no way diminishes the
claims to reparations articulated by other groups,51 most especially those made by
African-Americans.52
However, claiming the center in this charged discussion,53 even if only
temporarily, requires LatCritical sensibilities, particularly because defining
48. Substantive Program Outline, supra note 11.
49. See Robert Westley, Many Billions Gone: Is it Time to Reconsider the Case for Black
Reparations?, 40 B.C. L. REV. 429, 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 429, 436 (1998) [hereinafter "Westley,
Many Billions Gone"].
50- Comparative victimology can be defined as "the attempt to situate a given group ... at the
top of an imagined hierarchy of oppression." Westley, Many Billions Gone, supra note 49, at 457 n.1 11.
51. For example, in the Luxembourg Agreements Germany agreed to make reparations to
Jewish victims of the Holocaust, by making payments to Israel and to individual survivors of the Nazi
death camps. Westley, Many Billions Gone, supra note 49, at 453-58 (discussing Wiedergutmachung
agreements). Recently, the heirs of the victims and some survivors have pursued claims against Swiss
banks that illegally kept the deposits of victims. Westley, Many Billions Gone, supra note 49, at 433 n.16
and accompanying text. Japanese-Americans who were the victims of U.S. government-ordered
internment during World War 11 received an apology and money from the government of the United
States. See generally Eric Yamamoto, Racial Reparations: Japanese-American Redress and African-
American Claims, 40 B.C. L. REv. 487, 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 487 (1998) [hereinafter "Yamamoto,
Racial Reparations"].
52- In footnote 10 of his influential reparations article, Westley cites many works favoring
reparations for African-Americans. See Westley, Many Billions Gone, supra note 49, at 432 n.10.
Westley notes, however, that Derrick Bell has "cautionary views on the struggle for Black reparations" in
several works, which he cites. Id. But Westley explains that "[it is in part the lack of political
enthusiasm for a critical engagement of Black reparations since this initial effort that motivates [his
reparations] article." Id.
53. As the Substantive Program indicated: "Re/Defining the Reparations Discourse. By
looking at reparations through a LatCritical lens, we seek to "center" Latinas/os qua Latinas/os in legal
discourse, but to do so in a way that recognizes and accounts for the many axes of difference that help to
define Latina/o heterogeneity, both domestically and internationally." Substantive Program Outline,
supra note 11. See also supra note 30 (defining "to center").
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Blackness within LatCrit has occupied a great deal of our scholarly time.5 4 After all,
LatCrit was born, in part, out of a sense of exclusion(s) from the Critical Race
Theory Workshop (the annual meeting of RaceCrits), which was at the time
dominated by African-American scholars. 5" Additionally, the development of the
Black/White Binary Paradigm of race critique by LatCrit scholars56 was met with
substantial discomfort,5 7 and even some outright hostility,58 among our African-
54. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Identity, Democracy, Communicative Power,
Inter/National Labor Rights and the Evolution of LatCrit Theory and Community, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV.
575 (1999); Dorothy E. Roberts, BlackCrit Theory and the Problem of Essentialism, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV.
855 (1999); Athena D. Mutua, Shifting Bottoms and Rotating Centers: Reflections on LatCrit III and the
Black/White Paradigm, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1177 (1999); Stephanie L. Phillips, The Convergence of the
Critical Race Theory Workshop with LatCrit Theory: A History, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1247 (1999);
Valdes, OutCrit Theories, supra note 28; Sumi Cho and Robert Westley, Critical Race Coalitions: Key
Movements that Performed the Theory, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1377 (2000).
55. LatCrit has and will continue to have a fundamental intellectual link to CRT, but it
represents a re/orientation of Critical Race Theory to "center" outsider groups other than African-
Americans. The realization of the need for a separate space for this change in focus was not an easy
process. While I am not suggesting that there is a monolithic CRT experience, or that the CRT workshop
(the annual meeting of race erits) either represented the entire field of Critical Race Theory, or that it
lacked the capacity to grow, the dynamics of the workshop unfortunately appear to have generated a sense
of exclusion(s). See Valdis, Poised at the Cusp, supra note 29, at 3 n.5 ("CRT workshop in 1995 had
about forty participants, only two of which were Latina/o, Trina Grillo and [Frank Valds]"); Cho,
Essential Politics, supra note 21, at 449 (condemning the "ritualistic 'violence' against gay and lesbian
race crits in recent years at the [CRT] summer workshop"); see also Phillips, Convergence, supra note 54,
at 1249 n.4 (1999) (member of the original workshop organizing committee concedes that despite best of
intentions workshop "replicat[ed] troubling hierarchies . . . in particular, the privileging of African-
American experience and of heterosexuality"). For a brief history of the CRT workshop, see generally
Phillips, supra note 54 (describing history of the CRT workshop, explaining its "invitation only" policy,
and suggesting that the workshop and LatCrit Conference had similar memberships and intellectual goals,
and that they could and should be coordinated). For a more complete overview of the CRT-LatCrit
relationship, with the benefit of the maturity of LatCrit, see Valdis, OutCrit Theories, supra note 28.
56. See, e.g., Juan F. Perea, The Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race: The "'Normal
Science" of American Racial Thought, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1213 (1997), 10 LA RAZA L.J. 127 (1998)
[hereinafter "Perea, The Black/White Binary Paradigm"]; Ian F. Haney L6pez, Race and Erasure: The
Salience of Race to LatCrit Theory, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1153 (1997), 10 LA RAZA L.J. 57 (1998); Gloria
Sandrino-Glasser, Los Confundidos: De-Conflating Latinos/as' Race and Ethnicity, 19 CHICANo-LATINO
L, REV. 69 (1998); Rachel F. Moran, Neither Black Nor White, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 61 (1997)
(finding that Latinas/os are not adequately represented in American civil rights debate because they do not
fit within the paradigm); Ian F, Haney-L6pez, Retaining Race: LatCrit Theory and Mexican American
Identity in Hemandez v. Texas, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 279 (1997); Juan Perea, Five Axioms in Search
of Equality, 2 HAsv. LATINO L. REv. 231 (1997); Juan F. Perea Ethnicity and the Constitution: Beyond
the Black and White Binary Constitution, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 571 (1995). This LatCrit challenge to
the binary can be traced back to the very first LatCrit colloquium in Puerto Rico. See generally
Colloquium, Representing Latinalo Communities: Critical Race Theory and Practice, 9 LA RAZA L.J. I
(1996); see also Francisco Valdds, Latina/o Ethnicities, Critical Race Theory and Post-Identity Politics in
Postmodern Legal Culture from Practices to Possibilities, 9 LA RAZA L.J. 1, 20-24 (1996) (discussing
various authors' challenge to the black/white binary); Robert S. Chang, The Nativist's Dream of Return, 9
LA RAZA L.J. 55 (1996) (Asian-Americans do not fit within the "comfortable binary" of the Black/White
paradigm of race); Deborah Ramirez, Foregoing a Latino Identity, 9 LA RAZA L.J. 61, 63 (1996)
(explaining a personal experience that required her to challenge the paradigm in order properly to assist a
local Latina/o community).
57. See, e.g., Mutua, supra note 54, at 1179 ("Perea's description of the Black/White
paradigm as a binary relationship [in Perea, The Black/White Binary Paradigm, supra note 56] obscures
the key insight of the Black/White paradigm: its relationship to power."); Devon W. Carbado,
Introduction: The Ties That Bind, 19 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 283, 288 (1998) ("I am sympathetic to the
concerns that inform the Black/White paradigm critique .... That said, I have not always been pleased
with the way in which the Black/White paradigm critique is framed."); Leslie Espinoza & Angela Harris,
Embracing the Tar-Baby: LatCrit Theory and the Sticky Mess of Race, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1585, 1597
(1997), 10 LA RAZA L.J. 499, 510 (1998) [hereinafter "Espinoza & Harris, Embracing the Tar-Baby"]
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American fellow travelers.59 Nevertheless, because of LatCrit's aggressive and often
sensitive search for intersectionalities, and after strong debate, we have largely
managed to reach common ground that allows us to rotate centers to focus on
particular groups, without marginalizing other fellow outsiders.
60
LatCrit is self-consciously coalitional (intersectional) and anti-essentialist.
But LatCrit scholarship and its other interventions are also mature and sophisticated
enough to manage to rotate centers, or, in the words of Athena Mutua, to "shift
bottoms" to focus on different marginalized groups,
61 while avoiding essentialism. 62
The most important part of this process is to acknowledge diversity, and to avoid the
dangerous homogenization of entire groups as well as the pitfalls of comparative
victimology.
63
(Angela Harris discusses "Black Exceptionalism," which she defines as: "The Claim... that African-
Americans play a unique and central role in American social, political, cultural, and economic life, and
have done so since the nation's founding. From this perspective, the 'black-white paradigm' that Pcrca
condemns is no accident or mistake; rather it reflects an important truth.").
58. For example, Anthony Paul Farley has written a strong critique of the Black/White
paradigm theory:
There is no such thing [as the 'black/white paradigm']-except as a tool of the
master. The phrase has, unfortunately, become a truism in LatCrit Theory.
Rhetorical choices have political effects and the political effects of the phrase
"black-white paradigm" are reactionary. First, it serves white power to allow them
to divert their eyes and attention away from the people they hate the most to the
other Others whom they hate less. It is akin to saying "We talk too much about
your former slaves, Boss." Second, the phrase "black-white paradigm" is itself the
kind of conflationary move that LatCrit Theory condemns.
Anthony Paul Farley, All Flesh Shall See It Together, 19 CHIcA.NO-LATINo L. REV. 163, 171 (1998).
59. However, it is important to note, as the citations in the footnotes in this Part disclose, that
these strong scholarly debates have taken place in the context of the LatCrit conferences, and have been
amply developed in the articles published in its symposia. See also note 63 infra.
60 See Espinoza & Harris, Embracing the Tar-Baby, supra note 57 (a joint article about the
often difficult process of reaching common ground among marginalized groups); see also Elizabeth M.
Iglesias & Francisco Valdrs, Afterword: Religion, Gender, Sexuality, Race and Class in Coalitional
Theory: A Critical and Self-Critical Analysis of LatCrit Social Agendas, 19 CittCANO-LATINO L. REV. 503
(1998) [hereinafter "Iglesias & Valdes, Coalitional Theory"] (exploring how LatCrit can remain a self-
conscious and self-critical coalitional enterprise, capable of handling "eruptions" [strong differences of
opinion, such as that over gender at LatCrit I and that over religion and sexual orientation at LatCrit II], to
continue to move forward to develop both a sense of scholarly community [in friendship and solidarity]
while maintaining high standards of progressive critical legal scholarship). See also Kevin R. Johnson,
Celebrating LatCrit Theory: What Do We Do When the Music Stops?, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 753, 778-
79 (2000) (LatCrit must be capable of engaging in criticism that is constructive and even respectful of the
views of others; providing specific example).
61. See Mutua, Shifting Bottoms, supra note 54. This technique of "looking to the bottom'
can produce important insights by "examin[ing] carefully and critically the sources, workings and effects
of power by focusing on the sectors of society where power is wielded with most license and impunity.
This technique of 'looking to the bottom' to inform antisubordination theory makes sense because 'the
bottom' is where subordination is most harshly inflicted and most acutely felt." Iglesias & Valdds,
Coalitional Theory, supra note 60, at 516, citing Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom, supra note 25.
62. As Dorothy Roberts explains in her LatCrit III Symposium article: "Writing about Black
people is not essentialist in and of itself. It only becomes essentialist when the experiences discussed are
taken to portray a uniform Black experience or a universal experience that applies to every other group."
Roberts, BlackCrit Theory, supra note 54, at 857. And she further explains that "the problem of
essentialism [in Feminist legal theory] did not derive from studying the lives of particular women; it
derived from claiming that the lives of a particular groups of women represented all women." Id. at 856-
57.
63. Iglesias and Valdrs explain that LatCrit must avoid "racing to the bottom" in a
counterproductive search for "comparative victimhood." LatCrit must work "despite and beyond the
complex intersections of privilege and subordination that may otherwise tear it asunder along the multiple
[Vol. 13: 387
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In this LatCrit coalitional spirit, the remainder of this article reviews
existing reparations scholarship to inform a LatCrit solution to the lack of
sovereignty and the general racialized marginalization of Puerto Ricans that has been
imposed by U.S. imperialism, without prejudice to, and in the hope of affirmatively
assisting any other legitimate claims therefor.
64
II.
REPARATIONS THEORY THROUGH A LATCRIT LENS
A. The Legislation-Litigation Paradox for Reparations
Reparations generally, and postcolonial reparations in particular as defined
herein, will necessarily involve a legislative allocation of public resources.
Additionally, reparations theory has gained momentum in recent years in large
measure because of frustration with judicial decisions regarding racial discrimination
and the affirmative action remedy.65 But, as this section explains, judicial action
might paradoxically be the only effective catalyst for postcolonial reparations in the
Puerto Rico context.
The new reparations theory is mostly based on a pessimistic-albeit largely
accurate-view of the willingness and ability of U.S. courts to fashion appropriate
fissures that too often are produced by conclusory, abstract and uncritical assertions of comparative
victimhood-whether real or apparent." Iglesias & Valdes, Coalitional Theory, supra note 60, at 516
(footnote omitted). See also Valdds, OutCrit Theories, supra note 28, at 1316-21 (warning against
different forms of "regressive" nationalism(s) that would impose essentialized normativities within our
communities; solution is the aggressive, self-conscious discipline-and accompanying tensions-of
diversity); Mutua, Shifting Bottoms, supra note 54, at 1177-78 n.2 (explaining that focusing on "the
people at the bottom" is not a surrender to victimization, but rather a celebration of survival. "At the same
time, t do not think of survival or victimhood as all that binds, or should bind, these various groups. I
believe these groups have similarities that transcend oppression."); Westley, Many Billions Gone, supra
note 49, at 457 (warning against comparative victimology).
64. While colonized peoples will have many intersectionalities, this article does not claim that
the Puerto Ricans represent a universal colonial paradigm. After all, many other diverse groups suffer
from colonialism. See, e.g., George E. Bisharat, Land, Law, and Legitimacy in Israel and the Occupied
Territories, 43 AM. U. L. REv. 467 (1994). Furthermore, LatCrit Theory has identified colonialism as a
diverse and complex global challenge. See, e.g., Ediberto Romin, A Race Approach to International Law
(RAIL): Is There a Need for Yet Another Critique of International Law?, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1519
(2000) (advocating a race-based approach is needed in International Law to repair the legacy of racist
colonization and conquest); Tayyab Mahnud, Race, Reason, and Representation, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1581 (2000) (colonialism is one of the subordinating hallmarks of Western liberalism); Sylvia R. Lazos
Vargas, Globalization or Global Subordination?: How LatCrit Links the Local to Global and the Global
to the Local, 33 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 1429 (2000) (analytical overview of LatCrit's global and
inter/national engagements).
65. Robert Westley explains that his exploration of reparations is partly motivated by recent
setbacks against affirmative action:
Affirmative action for Black Americans as a form of remediation for perpetuation
of past injustice is almost dead. Due to a string of Supreme Court decisions
beginning with Bakke and leading up to Adarand, the future possibility of using
affirmative action to redress the perpetuation of past wrongs against Blacks is now
in serious doubt. Whereas some believe that the arguments supporting affirmative
action as a remedy or even a tool of social policy are still sound, affirmative action
programs continue to encounter strong political headwinds and judicial
disapprobation.
See Westley, Many Billions Gone, supra note 49, at 429-30 (footnotes omitted).
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remedies for enduring institutionalized racism. 66 People of color are seeing the legal
requirements of civil rights protections, as defined and enforced by the courts, being
continually eroded in this period of conservative backlash.67  Accordingly,
reparations theory seeks to advance, mostly through the legislative process which is
not tightly bound by the requirements imposed on judicial remedies, and is therefore
given greater leeway in action.
6 8
Legislative reparations theory implies that the victims seeking
compensation through reparations have the capacity to influence the political
branches of government and that those institutions have the will to act on their
behalf.69 Colonial reparations are the responsibility of the federal government.
Therefore, the pertinent branches of government are the elected legislators and the
executive officials of the U.S. government. "Political" is used here rather narrowly
to refer to the overtly political elections process of the members of the United States
Congress, president, and vice president. In contrast, since federal judges are
appointed, I do not include the judiciary among the "political" branches of
government.
Voting for or against political candidates and lobbying elected officials can
potentially produce positive results. But, unfortunately, these political venues and
methods are largely closed to or ineffective for Puerto Ricans. History shows that
the U.S. executive and legislative branches have consistently perpetrated the social
and legal constructs of Puerto Rican subordination, with the courts giving them the
power and discretion to do so. 70  More importantly, despite their U.S. citizenship,
Puerto Ricans do not have a congressional delegation, just one non-voting
representative in the U.S. Congress, 7' and are not allowed to vote in presidential
elections.72 This "democratic deficit '7 3 in the U.S.-Puerto Rico relationship makes
66. In favoring a legislative approach, Westley points out that "historically it has been
legislatures, not courts, that have in fact initiated the most comprehensive remedies to racial
subordination, Brown v. Board of Education and its progeny notwithstanding-" Westley, Many Billions
Gone, supra note 49, at 436.
67. See Westley, Many Billions Gone, supra note 49, at 435-36 ("No matter how unjustly, [in
this "period of backlash"] affirmative action has been pigeonholed in popular consciousness as an
'undeserved racial preference."'); see also Berta Esperanza Hemndez-Truyol, Indivisible Identities:
Culture Clashes, Confused Constructs and Reality Checks, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REv. 199, 218-24 (1997)
(a critical discussion of the conservative backlash against affirmative action in this country).
68. Westley explains: "Importantly, however, a tight fit with the individual rights paradigm
may be considered a legal prerequisite to success only in the context of judicially imposed redress. A
tight fit is not a moral prerequisite, nor is it a legal barrier to legislative redress. It is noteworthy that even
Japanese-American claims were denied by courts and ultimately awarded by Congress." Westley, Many
Billions Gone, supra note 49, at 452.
69. This if "success" is defined to mean the actual award of reparations. But Professor
Westley notes that: "Reparations are worth fighting for even if such a campaign is unlikely to be
successful, due to the intellectual benefit of racial dialogue." Westley, Many Billions Gone, supra note
49, at 436.
70. See generally Malavet, Cultural Nation. supra note 4. See also citations supra note 14.
71. 48 USC § 891 (1994) (allowing a "Resident Commissioner" to represent Puerto Rico in
the United States Congress). The Resident Commissioner's "[r]ole in Congress is determined by the
House rules under which he may be a member of only three House committees and may introduce bills
and speak on the House floor. He may not vote ...." ARNOLD H. LEIBOWITZ, DEFINING STATUS: A
COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES TERRITORIAL POSSESSIONS 224 (1989).
72. See De La Rosa v. United States, 842 F.Supp. 607, 609 (D.P.R. 1994) ("granting U.S.
citizens residing in Puerto Rico the right to vote in presidential elections would require either that Puerto
Rico become a state, or [the adoption of] a constitutional amendment"), affid, 32 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 1994).
See also Igartfia de la Rosa v. United States, 229 F.3d 80 (1st Cir. 2000), rev'g 107 F.Supp.2d 140, 141,
148 (D.P.R. 2000) (U.S. District Judge Jaime Pieras, Jr., wrote: "The present political status of Puerto
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any appeal to the political branches of government unlikely to succeed.74 Therefore,
a "political" solution to U.S. colonialism that involves either legislators or executive
officials may not be possible in the context of the U.S.-Puerto Rico relationship
without judicial intervention, at least as a catalyst.
In order to maintain its imperial authority, 75 the United States often purports
that its territories possess the level of sovereignty that they desire.76 Accordingly,
the United States as colonial power shifts to the colonized people-the Puerto
Ricans-all the legal and political burdens implicated in ending the colonial
occupation. Corresponding legal burdens are imposed by judicial opinions that give
the U.S. Congress almost unfettered authority to legislate in Puerto Rico, while
discriminating against its citizens. This creates a presumption of legality for any
status imposed by the United States on its territory (under U.S. law).
Political burdens imposed by the democratic deficit deprive Puerto Ricans
of meaningful participation in the national political process. Puerto Ricans must
bear the burden of pleading for a postcolonial status, the burden of production of
arguments in favor of it, and the burden of proving that they are entitled to any
remedy at all both in the courts and in the political arenas. The United States thus
completely avoids the responsibility of justifying the imposition of continued
colonialist occupation as legal or moral.
Because the political branches of the U.S. government insist upon the
requirement that Puerto Ricans end their own colonial imprisonment, I remain
convinced that in the absence of an armed struggle 77 -only judicial action will in
Rico has enslaved the United States citizens residing in Puerto Rico by preventing them from voting in
Presidential and Congressional elections and therefore is abhorrent to the most sacred of the basic
safeguards contained in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of the United States-freedom."
Accordingly, in denying the government's Motion to Dismiss, the court ruled that U.S. citizens residing in
Puerto Rico, either by birth or by relocation from the U.S. mainland, have a constitutional right to vote in
presidential elections.).
73. See Malavet, Cultural Nation, supra note 4, nn. 174-77 and accompanying text.
74. This conclusion is based on three factors: (1) the Puerto Ricans are not the constituents of
any of these elected voting legislators; (2) the Puerto Ricans are not an economically powerful group; and
(3) history has shown that the Puerto Ricans have an extremely small influence in the U.S. Congress.
75. "The United States [is] ... the largest overseas territorial power in the world. [It] now
governs five areas (Puerto Rico, [the] Virgin Islands, Guam, the Northern Marianas, and American
Samoa) with over four million people and has special responsibilities for three additional areas (Federated
States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands and Palau)." LEIBOWITZ, DEFINING STATUS, supra note 71, at
3.
76. For example, on March 20, 1953, the United States Ambassador to the United Nations,
Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., wrote to the U.N. Secretary General that Puerto Rico's new form of government
(the current status) was consistent with self-determination and thus not subject to the reporting
requirements of Article 73 of the U.N. Charter. See Memorandum by the Government of the United
States of America Concerning the Cessation of Transmission of Information under Article 73(e) of the
Charter with Regard to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, March 23, 1953, Dep't St. Bull., at 584-85
[hereinafter "Puerto Rico Memorandum"]; see also ANTONIO FERN6S ISERN, ESTADO LIBRE ASOCIADO
DE PUERTO RICO: ANTECEDENTES, CREAC1ON Y DESARROLLO HASTA LA EPOCA PRESENTE 213 (1988).
The memorandum sent to the U.N. in support of the Ambassador's statements described the process as
follows: "At the request of the people of Puerto Rico and with the approval of the Government of the
United States, Puerto Rico has voluntarily entered into the relationship with the United States that it has
chosen to describe as a 'commonwealth' relationship." The letter from Mr. Ambassador Lodge and the
memorandum were jointly assigned Number A/AC-35/L. 121 by the U.N. See UNITED NATIONS
RESOLUTIONS: SERIES 1: RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY VOL. IV, 1952-53, at 198
n.7 (Dusan J. Djonovich ed., 1973). In the memorandum, the United States Delegation quotes from the
Resolutions of the Puerto Rico Constitutional Convention, indicating that it "expresses the views of the
people of Puerto Rico as to the status they have now achieved." Puerto Rico Memorandum at 587.
77. I would not favor an armed struggle for independence.
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fact force the political branches of the United States government to act to decolonize
Puerto Rico.7 Skepticism about this theory is natural. Frankly, the courts have so
far not been helpful to Puerto Ricans in their search for sovereignty or equal rights
under U.S. law.79 In fact, some might argue that the courts are as political as any
other branch of the U.S. government. But, because of the democratic deficit of the
U.S.-Puerto Rico relationship which deprives the Puerto Ricans of direct
participation in national legislative and presidential elections, the judiciary is the
only branch of government where the Puerto Ricans might stand a small chance of
obtaining a federal declaration that continued territorial status violates the U.S.
Constitution.
The constitutional basis for the U.S. power over its territories, including
Puerto Rico, is the "Territorial Clause" of the Constitution, which reads as follows:
The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful
Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property
belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution
shall be so construed as to Prejudice any claims of the United
States, or of any particular state. 0
In the Insular Cases, resolved at the beginning of the twentieth century by
the U.S. Supreme Court, the clause was interpreted to give to the federal government
almost unfettered authority over the territories and territorial residents.
81
My basic argument is simple: It is unconstitutional for the United States to
remain a colonial power-a holder of territorial possessions under the U.S.
Constitution-for a period of over one hundred years. In other words, there is a
time limitation on the unfettered authority of the U.S. government pursuant to the
territorial clause.82 Even conceding that the government of the United States has the
78. See generally Malavet, Cultural Nation, supra note 4, at 28 n.17 and accompanying text,
nn. 174-77 and accompanying text, and 103-06.
79. See Malavet, Cultural Nation, supra note 4, at 32-41 (explaining how the current legal
regime, as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court, deprives the Puerto Rican U.S. citizens of equal rights
under the U.S. Constitution, and allocates to the federal government almost total authority to legislate in
matters applicable to the island).
80. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
81. The "Insular Cases" largely defined the legal rights of Puerto Ricans. Some scholars
would limit the label "Insular Cases" to include only nine cases resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court
during its 1901 term. Applying specifically to Puerto Rico, see Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 287
(1901) ("We are therefore of the opinion that the island of Porto Rico [sic] is a territory appurtenant and
belonging to the United States, but not part of the United States within the revenue clauses of the
constitution."); Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243, 244 (1901) (duties imposed after signing of
Treaty of Paris not properly executed); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222, 235 (1901) (after the
Treaty of Paris Puerto Rico was no longer subject to U.S. tariffs); Goete v. United States, 182 U.S. 221,
222 (1901) (Puerto Rico is not a foreign country under U.S. tariff laws); DeLima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1
(1901) (Puerto Rico is an island territory, not a foreign country within meaning of U.S. tariff laws).
However, cases resolved between 1901 and 1922 provided needed interpretation and clarification of the
legal regime applicable to America's overseas territories. Balzac v. People of Puerto Rico, 258 U.S. 298
(1922), appears to be the last case that could fall in this category. For a general discussion of this debate,
see Efrdn Rivera Ramos, The Legal Construction of American Colonialism: The Insular Cases (1901-
1922), 65 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 225 (1996).
82. This argument had been articulated prior to the resolution of the Insular Cases. See, e.g.,
ConstitutionalAspects ofAnnexation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 291, 292 (1898) ("[A]ccording to the spirit of the
Constitution, the subjection of annexed territory to exclusive federal control is an abnormal and temporary
stage necessarily preceding the normal and permanent condition of statehood-").
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power to acquire new lands by conquest, 83 the purpose of such land acquisition
under the constitution must be to determine that territory's suitability for
incorporation into the union, and "when the unfitness of particular territory for
incorporation is demonstrated the occupation [must] terminate., 84  While the
presumption of incorporation into the union, i.e., statehood, articulated in the
Northwest Ordinance of 178785 may no longer be in effect, 86 the requirement that
territorial status be transitional should be.
Cuba and the Philippines are examples of territories occupied by the United
States that eventually became independent.87 Accordingly, there is precedent for
territories becoming either states of the union or independent republics following the
transitional territorial status. I argue that these precedents establish: (1) that
statehood or independence are constitutional post-territorial status alternatives, and
(2) that territorial status must be transitional and therefore temporary. Congress has
the responsibility to make a determination about incorporating a territory into the
union as a state or giving it sovereignty as an independent state (or a truly bilateral
83. See Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 8 Wheat. 543 (1822) (Supreme Court ruled that the
"right of discovery" and the "right of conquest" gave Europeans legal title over the American Continents).
See also infra notes 166-167.
84 Downes, 182 U.S. at 343-44 (White, J. concurring). The context of Justice White's
statement is illuminating:
[T]he presumption necessarily must be that [the Congress], which within its lawful
sphere is but the expression of the political conscience of the people of the United
States, will be faithful to its duty under the Constitution, and, therefore, when the
unfitness of particular territory for incorporation is demonstrated the occupation
will terminate. I cannot conceive how it can be held that pledges made to an alien
people can be treated as more sacred than is that great pledge given by every
member of every department of the government of the United States to support and
defend the Constitution.
Downes, 182 U.S. at 343-44 (emphasis added).
85. "The Northwest Ordinance [of 1787] not only set forth the pattern of territorial
development which exists even today but also stated the underlying principle of territorial evolution in
U.S. law and tradition: that the goal of all territorial acquisition eventually was to be Statehood."
ARNOLD H. LEIBOWITZ, DEFINING STATUS: A COMPREHENStvE ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES
TERRITORIAL RELATIONS 6 (1989).
86. The shameful opinion by Chief Justice Taney in Scott v. Sanford included some important
anti-colonial language favoring the presumption of statehood for acquired territories. See Scott v.
Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (19 How.) 393, 446-47 (1857) ("[N]o power is given [to the Federal Government by
the U.S. Constitution] to acquire Territory to be held and governed permanently in that character....
[Territory] is acquired to become a State, and not to be held as a colony and governed by Congress with
absolute authority.")- However, much of this language was rejected as dicta by the majority in the first
Insular Cases, at least to the extent that Scott could be read to limit the power of Congress to pass
legislation to govern the territories while they remain as such. See, e.g., Downes, 182 U.S. at 250 ("[As]
we observed in De Lima v. Bidwell, the power to establish territorial governments has been too long
exercised by Congress and acquiesced in by this court to be deemed an unsettled question. Indeed, in the
Dred Scott case it was admitted to be the inevitable consequence of the right to acquire territory.").
87. Spain renounced any claim over Cuba in the Treaty of Paris. TREATY OF PARIS, art. I
("Spain relinquishes all claims of sovereignty over and title to Cuba."). Cuba was officially turned over to
the United States in January of 1899. CARLOS MARQUEZ STERLING & MANUEL MARQUEZ STERLING,
ItISTORIA DE LA ISLA DE CUBA 160 (1975). Cuba became an independent republic with a constitution that
was promulgated in 1901 and its first elected president took office in 1902. However, the United States
imposed the so-called Platt Amendment on June 21, 1901. This U.S. law gave the United States the right
to intervene in Cuba at its discretion. The law was finally abrogated by a treaty between the two nations
in 1934. The Philippines were ceded to the United States by Spain through the Treaty of Paris. TREATY
OF PARIS, art. III ("Spain cedes to the United States the archipelago known as the Philippine Islands").
The archipelago became independent in 1946.
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free associated state).88 Accordingly, because of Congress's failure to change Puerto
Rico's colonial (territorial) status after a more than reasonable 100-year period
following the occupation of the island and the first Insular Cases, it is now up to the
U.S. courts to order the federal government to construct a non-territorial,
constitutional status for the people of Puerto Rico.
Nevertheless, the actual implementation of a postcolonial future for mi isla
(my island) will require legislative and executive actions that will be informed by the
current scholarship regarding the problems of reparations. Reparations scholarship
may assist in designing a transition to sovereignty and empowerment for Puerto
Ricans that gives them true political citizenship while allowing them to maintain a
separate and distinct cultural citizenship.
8 9
B. Constructing a LatCritical Meaning for Reparations
Reparations, as that term is used here, are a general remedy implemented
through a judicial or legislative allocation of public resources (general tax and other
government revenues) to create programs that will allow a previously marginalized
group to acquire full economic, political, and social citizenship within the national
polity, by repairing the harm(s) caused by the normative (dominant) legal/political
culture.
90
"The basis of the claim for reparations is not need, but entitlement. Need is
not irrelevant, but it is by no means central to the claim. Reparations as a norm seek
to redress government-sanctioned persecution and oppression of a group."9 In the
case of Puerto Ricans, the colonization of the island, and the legal definition of
Puerto Rican citizenship as second-class,9 2 mark the most obvious elements of
88. A bilateral free associated state is one whose legal regime is equally binding on both
related states (in this case the United States and Puerto Rico). The current legal regime for Puerto Rico is
called Free Associated State in Spanish, but it is not bilateral because it is subject to unilateral legislative
action by the United States. See Malavet, Cultural Nation. supra note 4, at 32-45. 1 have argued that, on
the basis of U.S. domestic law, the only way to accomplish bilateral free association that is mutually
binding on the United States and on the so-called free associated state, and thus a legitimate postcolonial
status, is an amendment to the Constitution of the United States. See Malavet, Cultural Nation, supra
note 4, at 96-98, 99-102. However, perhaps reflecting a different regime under international law, there are
currently three states that are members of the United Nations and have different forms of so-called "Free
Association" with the United States. See U.N. Press Release ORG/1317 (26 September 2000), available
at http://www.un.org/Overview/umember.html (last visited November 4, 2002) (Federated States of
Micronesia, admitted 17 Sep. 1991; Marshall Islands, admitted 17 Sep. 1991; Palau, admitted 15 Dee.
1994); see also LEIBOWITZ, DEFINING STATUS, supra note 75, at 639-703 (discussing "Compacts of Free
Association" between the United States and the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and
Palau).
89. See supra note 4. The protection of cultural citizenship within a single multicultural polity
is discussed in Part IIC infra, after first defining the meaning of reparations in Part liB.
90. Although the reference here is to the dominant one, the term "culture" is generally used
herein in a broader sense:
[C]ulture is a whole way of life (ideas, attitudes, languages, practices, institutions,
structures of power) and a whole range of cultural practices: artistic forms, texts,
canons, architecture, mass-produced commodities, and so on. Culture means the
actual grounded terrain of practices, representations, languages, and customs of any
specific historical society. Culture, in other words, means not only 'high culture,'
what we usually call art and literature, but also the everyday practices,
representations, and cultural productions of people and of postindustrial societies.
CARLA FRECCERO, POPULAR CULTURE: AN INTRODUCTION 13 (1999).
91. Westley, Many Billions Gone, supra note 49, at 473.
92. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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oppression. The social construction of the Puerto Ricans 93 as being inassimilable
because they belong to a single, inferior, non-white race is both the basis for
identifying the victimized group, and the harm caused to them by the United States.
It also is important to understand "reparations not as compensation, but as
'repair'-the restoration of broken relationships through justice. 94  Reparations
allow marginalized groups to "position themselves as creditors seeking payment of
an overdue debt, rather than as racial supplicants seeking an undeserved preference,"
thus countering the reactionary deconstruction of affirmative action through the
myth of meritocracy. 95 Accordingly, modern reparations theory seeks to empower
outsider groups
to coalesce as communities affirming real equality around
development of a legal norm in the United States that mandates
reparations to groups victimized by racism that is not group
specific. Such a norm would apply to any group that could show
the requisite degree of harm from racism, linked to an international
standard of human rights, plus a reliable estimate of damages.
96
Depending on the nature of the damages, reparations are not necessarily
strictly monetary, as discussed below, 97 but they necessarily involve an allocation of
governmental resources in one way or another.98 As Westley indicates, reparations
have to be a general remedy, paid by the government, as the principal perpetrator,
using general taxpayer revenues, as spent by the legislature. In the case of Puerto
Rico this may perhaps require a court order. To the extent that this entails monetary
reparations, they should not take the form of individual payments, since that would
be inconsistent with the group-vindication that is the basis of the claim.
99
Nevertheless, intra-group class differences must necessarily come into play when
designing any economic remedy to resolve the problems of the marginalized.
93. On the social construction of the Puerto Ricans by the United States, see generally
Malavet, Cultural Nation, supra note 4, at 41-45; Malavet, Accidental Crit , supra note 13.
94. Yamamoto, Racial Reparations, supra note 51, at 483.
95. Westley, Many Billions Gone, supra note 49, at 436.
96. Westley, Many Billions Gone, supra note 49, at 436. Yamamoto explains further that the
"repair paradigm of reparations" focuses on (1) historical wrongs committed by one
group, (2) which harmed, and continue to harm, both the material living conditions
and psychological outlook of another group, (3) which, in turn, has damaged
present-day relations between the groups, and (4) which ultimately has damaged the
larger community, resulting in divisiveness, distrust, social disease-a breach in the
polity. Within this framework, reparations by the polity and for the polity are
justified on moral and political grounds-healing social wounds by bringing back
into the community those wrongly excluded.
Yamamoto, Racial Reparations, supra note 51, at 524.
97. See infra Part liB.
98. For example, the grant of sovereignty is a political/legal act which, in and of itself, does
not involve direct expenditures. See infra Part 11A. The provision of full disclosure regarding acts of
political repression also might not in and of itself involve money. See infra Part I11A. But the fact of the
matter is that almost any governmental action, with the possible exception of an apology, will likely
require some reallocation of resources and produce at least some opportunity cost, if not direct
expenditure.
99. 1 very much agree with Bob Westley when he opposes individual payments. Westley,
Many Billions Gone. supra note 49, at 468. My project is about putting the Puerto Ricans in a position to
cam money by controlling their own sovereignty and economy, not about feeding them for day or two.
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Accordingly reparations should focus on "the poorest among us [who] should be
compensated first and through meaningful (not symbolic) monetary transfers."
' 00
C. Re/Creating Citizenship for Oppressed Groups Through
Reparations
In framing its objectives and beneficiaries, reparations theory is conscious
of the difference between legal and political citizenship, on the one hand, and
cultural and social citizenship on the other. 1' By focusing on marginalized groups,
reparations theory continues the group-centered communitarian 102 challenge to the
traditional individual-focus of liberalism seen in the citizenship debates.'
0 3
In the citizenship debates, defenders of liberalism' °4 favor the "toleration"
model of the liberal state as a solution to the challenges of multiculturalism-diverse
cultural identities and citizenships-within the modem state.10 5 But communitarians
100. Westley, Many Billions Gone, supra note 49, at 437. Cf Yamamoto, Racial
Reparations, supra note 51, n.5 and accompanying text (discussing "symbolic" nature of reparations for
Japanese-American World War II internees).
101. The distinction and disjunction between cultural and political citizenship has been a
strong theme in critical theory generally and LatCrit theory in particular. See, e.g., Malavet, Cultural
Nation, supra note 4 (describing how the Puerto Ricans are an identifiable culture that lacks a legal
citizenship, and how they are deprived of real political power because of their legally second-class U.S.
citizenship); Westley, Many Billions Gone, supra note 49 (advocating reparations to bring African-
Americans to full political citizenship in the United States); Yamamoto, Racial Reparations, supra note
51 (a critical review of reparations for the internment of U.S. citizens of Japanese descent during World
War 1I); Guadalupe T. Luna, ChicanaChicano Land Tenure in the Agrarian Domain: On the Edge of a
"Naked Knife," 4 MICH. J. RACE & L. 39 (1998) [hereinafter "Luna, Naked Knife"] (detailing how
Mexican-Americans in the Southwest had their land taken away in spite of their legal citizenship--and
their property rights); Kevin R. Johnson, The Social and Legal Construction of Nonpersons, 28 U. MIAMI
INTER-AM. L. REV. 263, 268 (1997) ("The alien represents a body of rules passed by Congress and
reinforced by popular culture. It is society, often through the law, which defines who is an alien, an
institutionalized "other," and who is not. It is society through Congress and the courts that determines
which rights to afford aliens."). See generally Symposium: Citizenship and its Discontents: Centering the
Immigrant in the Inter/National Imagination, 76 OR. L. REV. 207-774 (1997); Ibrahim J. Gassama et al.,
Foreword, 76 OR. L. REV. 207, 209 (1997) ("The papers in this Symposium investigate the aporectic
relations among the nation-state, liberal understandings of citizenship, and problematic constructions of
race and ethnicity as they are applied to immigrants.").
102. The communitarian concept of citizenship views the "citizen as a member of a
community." Herman Van Gunsteren, Four Conceptions of Citizenship, in T14E CONDITION OF
CITIZENSHIP 36, 41 (Bart van Steenbergen ed., 1994). "This conception strongly emphasizes that being a
citizen means belonging to a historically developed community. Individuality is derived from it and
determined in terms of it." Id. Moreover, "identity and stability of character cannot be realized without
the support of a community of friends and like-minded kindred." Id.
103. "The theme of citizenship and the kinds of questions raised herewith have reemerged into
the center of public debate in the past few years (together with the concept of civil society) as the focus of
policies and studies regarding a number of major contemporary purposes. . .. ." Gershon Shafir,
Introduction: The Evolving Tradition of Citizenship, in THE CITIZENSHIP DEBATES: A READER 1 (Gershon
Shafir ed., 1998). "[The] essays [included in the reader] are a fitting summary of the debates in which the
character of our future society is contested." Id at 27. The book includes a discussion of the "Liberal
Position," followed by critiques thereof labeled as: "Communitarian," "Social Democratic," "Nationalist,"
"Immigrant and Multiculturalist," and "Feminist." Id. at v-vi.
104. For example, in his works, Will Kymlicka self-maps as a modem liberal scholar, a la
Ronald Dworkin. KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY AND CULTURE 10 (1991) ("modem liberals
from J.S. Mill through to Rawls and Dworkin"). See also RONALD DWORKIN, LAWS EMPIRE (1997);
RONALD DwORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1999).
105. Kymlicka presents important objections to the multicultural/communitarian critiques of
liberal theory that challenge the critics to prove the shortcomings of liberalism or to admit that they are
using liberal theory to construct a new paradigm for a more complicated world. Kymlicka for example
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counter by saying that since liberalism is not an inherently progressive political
theory, 10 6 it requires a multicultural, critical lens to produce a form of citizenship that
truly empowers cultural outsiders.'0 7  For example, Jotrguen Habermas provides a
coherent political theory that attempts to resolve the problems of outsider groups
within the multicultural state.'0 8  Habermas argues that it is possible to respect
multiculturalism in a modem democratic society. Individual and group cultural
differences can exist, and the state can thrive, if the citizens exercise what he calls
"constitutional patriotism," under which individuals are free to develop their own
personal or group culture'0 9 as long as they share legal/political citizenship and a
common political culture." 1
0
In the context of Puerto Rico, and in most colonial situations, the concept of
cultural nationhood or citizenship can be used to differentiate the colonized peoples
from their colonial oppressors;"' it can additionally be used as a source of
empowerment, consciousness, and pride."l 2  But, cultural exploration might also
would argue that recognition of community and culture is a process of the evolution of liberalism, rather
than a competing paradigm that requires the rejection of liberalism. "Considering the nature and value of
cultural membership not only takes us down into the deepest reaches of a liberal theory of the self, but
also outward to some of the most pressing questions of justice and injustice in the modem world."
KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY AND CULTURE, supra note 104, at 258. See also MICHAEL
WALZER, ON TOLERATION 111-12 (1997) ("The centrifugal forces of culture and selfbood will correct one
another only if the correction is planned.... [T]he political creed that defends the framework, supports
the necessary forms of state action, and so sustains the modem regimes of toleration-is social
democracy. If multiculturalism today brings more trouble than hope, it does so in part because of the
weakness of social democracy (in this country, left liberalism). But that is another, longer story.").
106. "[Liberalism] is not always a progressive doctrine, for many classical liberals are
skeptical about the average human being's ability to make useful advances in morality and culture, for
instance." Alan Ryan, Liberalism, in A COMPANION TO CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 293
(Robert E. Goodin & Phillip Petit eds., 1993).
107. See generally Malavet, Cultural Nation, supra note 4, at 75-96 (describing the failure of
liberal citizenship as a model that truly empowers minorities within the multicultural state, and
articulating a reformed liberalism with a multicultural sensibility).
108. See JUrgen Habermas, Citizenship and National Identity, in THEORIZING CITIZENSHIP
264 (Ronald Beiner ed., 1995) [hereinafter "THEORZING CITIZENSHIP"] ("One's own national tradition
will... have to be appropriated in such a mainer that it is related to and relativized by the vantage points
of the other national cultures. It must be connected with the overlapping consensus of a common,
supranationally shared political culture.... Particularist anchoring of this sort would in no way impair
the universalist meaning of popular sovereignty and human rights.").
109. "Culture" as used by Habermas does not mean the stereotypes that are often used by the
normative society to discriminate against certain groups discussed above. Rather, Habermas refers to
positive cultural self-constructs. See infra note 110 and accompanying text.
110. See Jirgen Habermas, Citizenship and National Identity, in THEORIZING CITIZENSHIP,
supra note 108, at 264.
[E]xamples of multicultural societies like . the United States demonstrate that a
political culture in the seedbed of which constitutional principles are rooted by no
means has to be based on all citizens sharing the same language or the same ethnic
and cultural origins. Rather, the political culture must serve as the common
denominator for a constitutional patriotism which simultaneously sharpens an
awareness of the multiplicity and integrity of the different forms of life which
coexist in a multicultural society.
Id.
111. See, e.g., Malavet, Cultural Nation, supra note 4 (explaining that the Puerto Ricans are
culturally distinct from the normative U.S. society).
112. Hence, "othering" can be used as a subversive force that empowers marginalized colonial
peoples. See Adeno Addis, On Human Diversity and the Limits of Toleration, in ETHNICITY AND GROUP
RIGHTS 127 (Will Kymlicka and Ian Shapiro eds., 1997) ("By 'shared identity' I mean to refer to an
identity that bonds together, partially and contingently, minorities and majorities, such that different
cultural and ethnic groups are seen, and see themselves, as networks of communication where each group
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produce legitimate concerns over the dangers of nationalism" 3 and cultural
imperialism. 1 4  Accordingly, LatCrit theory must illuminate the proper balance
between identifying cultural faultlines that require reform, and the imposition of
cultural imperialism that seeks a homogenized normativity that only perpetuates the
hegemony of the colonial power. This leads to a crucial question in the reparations
debate: "Whether reparations are regressive in the sense that they entrench biological
fictions of race."" 5
Westley cites Justice Bradley to illustrate the often unarticulated view of
white Americans regarding African-Americans:
When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of
beneficent legislation has shaken off the inseparable concomitants
of that state, there must be some stage in the progress of his
elevation when he takes the rank of a mere citizen, and ceases to
be the special favorite of the laws, and when his rights as a citizen,
or a man, are to be protected in the ordinary modes by which other
men's rights are protected." 6
Paradoxically, eschewing its hetero-patriarchal components, this statement
of the legal meaning of citizenship represents, in some ways, what Puerto Ricans
aspire to, given that their citizenship is legally constructed as inferior to that of any
citizen of the United States who does not reside in the territory of Puerto Rico." 7
Here, Westley is discussing the search for real citizenship for African-Americans
within the United States. In so doing, he constructs a response to Justice Bradley
that one can apply to the Puerto Rican's search for equal citizenship:
comes to understand its distinctiveness as well as the fact that distinctiveness is to a large degree defined
in terms of its relationship with the Other.").
113. In speaking of the dangers of nationalism, Ronald Beiner ponders: "Either fascism is a
uniquely evil expression of an otherwise benign human need for belonging; or there is a kind of latent
fascism implicit in any impulse towards group belonging." Ronald Beiner, Introduction, in THEORIZING
CITIZENSHIP, supra note 108, at 19.
114. Freccero explains:
Imperialism can occur on different levels and usually involves territorial
annexation, economic and political annexation, juridical (legal) annexation, and
ultimately ideological and cultural annexation; these latter are often referred to as
cultural imperialism . . . . [C]ultural or mental decolonization [is] a
"literature/criticism that is participatory in the historical processes of hegemony and
resistance to domination rather than (only) formal and analytic." Collective and
concerted resistance to programmatic cultural imperialism thus comes to be called
"cultural" or "mental" decolonization.
FRECCERO, supra note 90, at 68 (citations omitted).
115. Westley, Many Billions Gone, supra note 49, at 437.
116. Westley, Many Billions Gone, supra note 49, at 475, citing Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S.
3, 25 (1883).
117. This is just one of the many paradoxes of the Territorial Clause and of the alien/citizen
paradox of the Puerto Ricans. The U.S Congress, pursuant to the Territorial Clause, see supra note 80,
has authority legally to define the privileges and legal rights of the Puerto Ricans, unfettered by traditional
constitutional constraints that apply to any other U.S. citizens. It is a system of state-defined
subordination, that has been given seemingly oxymoronic constitutional status. (The brilliant term
"alien/citizen paradox" was coined by Ediberto Roman. See RomAn, Alien/Citizen Paradox, supra note
14).
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As Justice Harlan expressed then in dissent, and we today may
acknowledge, "[i]t is scarcely just to say that the colored race has
been the special favorite of the laws[;]" and less than twenty years
out from slavery, in event, did not mark the point in Black
progress at which equality with whites no longer should have been
a national concern. The maintenance of a system in which "any
class of human beings" is kept "in practical subjection to another
class, with power in the latter to dole out to the former just such
privileges as they may choose to grant[,] marks Justice Bradley's
statements as not only unreasonable, but also unjust. It is no less
unreasonable and unjust today."'1 8
Critical Race and LatCrit theorists have recognized that group or identity
rights are often opposed by traditional liberals and modern reactionaries. 1 9 In the
case of the Puerto Ricans, they are treated as a group for the purpose of
constitutional deprivation of constitutional rights guaranteed to every U.S. citizen
who resides in the "United States proper,, 120 but not for purposes of an equal
allocation of the public resources spent on "regular" U.S. citizens.
121
As a result of the ongoing colonial experience, there are at least two
substantial Puerto Rican communities ' 22 that interact with and are distinguished from
estadounidenses (people of the United States):123 Puerto Ricans in Puerto Rico, and
Puerto Ricans in the "United States proper." In Puerto Rico, the terms that are used
118. Westley, Many Billions Gone, supra note 49, at 475-76, citing Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. 3, at 62 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
119. Yamamoto, for example, explains how traditionalists resist reparations claims arguing for
strict requirements of individual liability and individual entitlement. Yamamoto, Racial Reparations,
supra note 51, at 489.
120. See supra note 6. Robert Westley notes that "[tlhe irony posed by the very question of
Black national group status is that in ordinary social and political discourse, Blacks are treated as a group
for every purpose other than rights-recognition." Westley, Many Billions Gone, supra note 49, at 469.
121. See Malavet, Cultural Nation, supra note 4, at 37-40. This part of the article discusses
two Supreme Court cases that allowed the U.S. Congress to discriminate against Puerto Ricans on the
island by allocating to them dramatically lower levels of federal funding, or no funding at all; the cases
are Harris v. Santiago-Rosario, 446 U.S. 651 (1980), and Califano v. Gautier-Torres, 435 U.S. 1 (1978).
Even the reporting of the cases reflects cultural imperialism. As the case itself indicates, the
name of the plaintiff in the Califano case was Cdsar Gautier-Torres. In Puerto Rico we commonly use
both our parents' last names, with the paternal last name first. Most estadounidenses choose to take the
paternal last name as a middle name and thus incorrectly identify the case and the person. The name of
the plaintiff in the Harris case was Awilda Santiago-Rosario; once again, the last names are incorrectly
used in the reporter. Just a few pages before the Harris case in the same reporter, you can find the case
officially identified as Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980) (about qualified immunity for local
officials). The names of the litigants in that case were Carlos Rivera-G6mez and the former Puerto Rico
Chief of Police, Astol Calero-Toledo.
122. Puerto Rico has almost 4 million residents, and there are over 2.7 million Puerto Ricans
in the United States mainland. FRANCISCO R. RIVERA B.TIZ & CARLOS E. SANTIAGO, ISLAND PARADOX:
PUERTO Rico IN THE 1990S 23, 127 (1996) (the 1990 census recorded 3.5 million residents of Puerto Rico,
and 2.7 million Puerto Ricans in the mainland). On the cultural links between mainland and island Puerto
Rican communities, see generally RUTH GLASSER, MY MusIc IS MY FLAG* PUERTO RICAN MUSICIANS
AND THEIR NEW YORK COMMUNIES 1917-1940 (1995); ANGEL G. QUINTERO RIVERA, SALSA SABOR Y
CONTROL: SOCIOLOGiA DE LA MtSICA TROPICAL (1998).
123. This is not to suggest an acceptance of a single American homogenized culture, since that
would be the result of an essentialist process that imposes a homogenized normativity. However, there is
at least an attempt at a normative Angla/o-American culture that does not include the Latinas/os within the
U.S. borderlands.
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to distinguish the three groups of American citizens described above are gringalo
(used to refer to a non-Latina/o citizen of the United States), 124 niuyorican (although
it specifically refers to New York City, it is used to refer to persons of Puerto Rican
descent born anywhere in the United States), and isleha/o (used to refer to Puerto
Ricans born on and presently living on the island).1
25
The group entitled to reparations in the U.S.-Puerto Rico postcolonial
implementation should include all island-born Puerto Ricans who live on the island,
the islehas/os, as they constitute an identifiable cultural nation with a definable
territory that is entitled to sovereignty. I am willing to allow mainland-born Puerto
Ricans to migrate to Puerto Rico to become citizens, with probably a one-year
residency requirement. Additionally, island-born Puerto Ricans who had left would
likewise be allowed to return, if they so chose. I would also consider naturalization
for any other U.S. citizen, native or naturalized, and for foreign citizens living in
Puerto Rico. 26 But, absent a return to the island, I have purposely chosen to exclude
those of us who reside in the "United States proper" because that migration from la
isla to the "states" results in more legal and political rights, at least in theory, 27 than
those enjoyed by the Puerto Ricans on the island. In any case, despite the realities of
marginalization in the U.S. mainland, the truth is that the Puerto Ricans in Puerto
Rico represent the "poorest among us" and are thus the group most entitled to
reparations.' Moreover, their relationship to the land is legally determinative, since
the sovereignty and political empowerment remedies advocated here apply to the
territory of Puerto Rico.
III.
REPARATIONS, AND THE POLITICS OF COLONIAL CITIZENSHIP
The traditional narrative about Puerto Rico in the United States posits that
the Puerto Rican isleuias/os "have the best of both worlds" because "they" do not pay
federal taxes and nonetheless get federal benefits. 29 But this narrative is initially
misleading and ultimately completely false.
124. See Malavet, Accidental Crit 11, supra note 13, at 767-71 (explaining how gringo is a
descriptive term, as properly defined in Spanish dictionaries, not an epithet, as it is often characterized in
English dictionaries).
125. See id.
126. I would require at least five years of legal residence after any change in status to become
a resident of the island.
127. On the negative social construction of Puerto Ricans, and accompanying deprivation of
rights, in the "U.S. proper," see supra note 93 and accompanying text. In that regard, the Puerto Rican
colonial experience has many parallels to that of Chicanas/os. One prominent example is land
dispossession, Guadalupe Luna has studied the Chicana/o experience and summarized it as follows:
Neither sovereignty nor property rights could forestall American geopolitical
expansion in the first half of the nineteenth century. [T]he study of Mexican land
dispossession suggests both the need to expand the traditional approach to teaching
property law as well as the importance of deploying the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo and international law in the struggle for racial equity.
Luna, Naked Knife, supra note 101.
128. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
129. I have often been exposed to this narrative in my city of residence, Gainesville, Florida.
Colleagues at the law school, law professors nonetheless, have made statements to this effect. More
recently, when I pointed out to my hairdresser that I was Puerto Rican and that I favored independence,
she inquired almost like a mantra, "But don't you have the best of both worlds?", and articulated the
incorrect view of Puerto Rico's economic relationship to the United States. I wonder how such apparent
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On Sunday, September 13, 1999, the New York Times ran an article
reporting on the release of Puerto Rican political prisoners that reflected the "best of
both worlds" attitude. The last paragraph of that story read as follows:
As residents of a United States commonwealth, Puerto Ricans do
not pay Federal taxes but receive $11 billion annually in Federal
aid. They are United States citizens but cannot vote for
President.
30
Initially, the statement, as drafted, is factually incorrect. Puerto Ricans do
not pay federal income taxes, but they have to pay Social Security and FICA taxes
on income earned in Puerto Rico.1 3 1 Additionally, "[t]he local personal income tax in
Puerto Rico is higher than in most states, including both federal and local
contributions." 132 Finally, the narrative about taxation is quite misleading because,
given the level of poverty in Puerto Rico, few of the island residents would be
required to pay any federal income tax at all and it would certainly not be a
substantial source of income for the federal treasury.' 
33
More importantly, the narrative is crafted to create a false impression that
all Puerto Ricans live off the "generosity" of the United States. Puerto Rico is a
United States territory, and Puerto Ricans arc United States citizens. Therefore, the
United States is simply fulfilling its obligations to citizens of the United States, not
providing "aid." In fact, the U.S. citizens residing in Puerto Rico receive federal
benefits at a rate lower than citizens residing in the continental United States and
bear a disproportionately high level of local taxation.'
34
Moreover, I believe that in both private economic gain and the use of
Puerto Rican land for military and other federally defined public purposes,' 3S the
island has produced substantial profit and economic service to the United States
misspending of taxpayers' money might be justified by their congressional delegations if it was in fact
true.
130. Hundreds Gather to Welcome Pardoned Militants in Puerto Rico, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13,
1999, at A27.
131. See Lisa Napoli, The Legal Recognition of the National Identity of a Colonized People:
The Case of Puerto Rico, 18 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 159, 176-77 nn.68-69 and accompanying text (1998)
("The people of Puerto Rico also pay other federal taxes and user fees such as Social Security, unemployment
and Medicare taxes, and customs duties. According to Bareelo [the Resident Commissioner], the U.S.
Treasury collected $2.5 billion from the island in 1993.").
132. Id.
133. See FRANCIscO L. RIVERA-BATIZ & CARLOS E. SANTIAGO, ISLAND PARADOX: PUERTO
RICO IN THE 1990s 65, Table 4.2 and accompanying text (1996) (mean per capita household income in
1989 was $4,099 in Puerto Rico, and the U.S. average was $14,052). And Puerto Ricans living in the
largest metropolitan areas in the United States earn only between 35% and 79.5% of the mean household
income for that particular area. Id. at 135-39, Table 7.7 and accompanying text.
134. See supra note 121.
135. For example, a recent book that details the negotiations between the United States and
Puerto Rican governments regarding military training on the islands of Vieques and Culebra includes
extensive lists of land owned by the U.S. military that was valued in millions of dollars in 1961. EVELYN
VELEZ RODRiGUEZ, PROYECTO V-C, NEGOCIACIONES SECRETAS ENTRE Luis MufTOZ MARiN Y LA
MARINA: PLAN DR.ACULA 151-58 (2002). The book explains that local officials code-named their
negotiations with the U.S. military the "Dracula Plan," after the literary vampire, because of the military's
demand that all corpses be removed from the cemeteries on the islands of Vieques and Culebra if they
were transferred to the U.S. Id. at 15-16 n.1.
2002]
HeinOnline  -- 13 Berkeley La Raza L.J. 411 2002
BERKELEY LA RAZA LA WJOURNAL
during the more than 100 years of occupation. 136  For example, nine out of ten
pharmaceuticals consumed in the United States are produced in Puerto Rico,. by a
U.S.-controllcd $27-billion industry.1 37 In addition, the United States has substantial
military bases in Puerto Rico, including its largest naval base and only remaining
combined arms live-fire training site-Vieques island. 138  The government
apparently wishes to continue to use them.
139
Economic reparations would be designed to undo the damages caused by
this colonial exploitation. But reparations are not simply economic, they can also be
political and psychological. Puerto Rico is entitled to a construction of its
sovereignty and the reconstruction of the citizenship of Puerto Ricans through
constitutional legal reform. It is also entitled to a repair of the reputational damage
done by the essentialized social construction of Puerto Ricans by the United States,
and the emotional damage caused by the imperialist occupation of the island.
Accordingly, the types of reparations that would be relevant in the Puerto
Rico-U.S. colonial context are, at least: (1) the construction of sovereignty; (2) the
return of property and monetary compensation for the occupation; (3) information
disclosure; and (4) apology. Each category will be briefly discussed below.
A. Citizenship Reparations: The Construction of Puerto Rican
Sovereignty
Generally speaking, the politics of legal citizenship and status for Puerto
Ricans can be divided into three categories, identified with the political parties on
the island: (1) pro-statehood; (2) pro-commonwealth; and (3) pro-independence. 140
Those who favor statehood want Puerto Rico to become a state of the union, thereby
giving its citizens full, permanent United States citizenship.' 41 Those who favor the
136. I hope to develop this theme in my upcoming book. See supra note 22. But let me point
out that I find it absurd that the United States would continue to maintain Puerto Rico as a territory if it
were a substantial net drain on the treasury. It seems inconceivable that U.S. legislators and executive
officials would engage in this 100-year history without having a substantial federal purpose (or purposes)
that produced net benefits for their constituents.
137. ELNUEvO DiA, Oct. 6, 2002.
138. See infra note 156 and accompanying text.
139. See infra notes 199, 200, and 201 and accompanying text. Lt. General William P.
Tangney, USA, Deputy Commander In Chief, United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM),
recently described the value of the training site, in response to congressional inquiries about its possible
closure. He stated that "with the non-availability of Vieques, which, of course, was a combined live fire
range which is traditionally used by the carrier battle groups and the fleet as part of their work-ups, I am
not aware of any facilities on the East Coast where you could do comprehensive, live fire that involved all
of the formations in a joint task force. You can do that to a certain extent at Camp LeJeune, North
Carolina. You can do a little bit at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. But you really don't have the full access
and terrain to pull it all together with the airspace to make it happen." FDCH POLiTICAL TRANSCRIPTS,
May 16, 2002, Thursday, Transcript of House Government Committee Hearing.
140. On the Puerto Rico political parties and elections, see generally BAYRON-TORO,
ELECCIONES Y PARTIDOS POLiTICOS DE PUERTO RiCO, supra note 24 (providing information about the
parties and their basic platforms, as well as election results in Puerto Rico from 1809 until 1988). On the
Independence Party position in particular, see Manuel Rodriguez-Orellana, Vieques: The Past, Present,
and Future of the US.-Puerto Rico Colonial Relationship, 13 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 425 (2002) (the
LatCrit VII symposium essay penned by the Puerto Rico Independence party vice president and LatCrit
VII keynote speaker).
141. Efren Rivera-Ramos discusses some of the debate about Puerto Rican statutory
citizenship. The Congressional Research Service, for example, has argued that because Puerto Rican
citizenship is statutory, it is therefore not covered by the first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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current commonwealth likewise favor permanent United States legal citizenship, but
under the free associated state/commonwealth relationship. 142  Finally, the pro-
independence movement favors an end to U.S. citizenship and the creation of legal
Puerto Rican citizenship that is recognized under international law.143 Any of these
categories requires basic institutional reform and has the potential to produce a
legitimate postcolonial Puerto Rico.1
44
Eric Yamamoto provides an important warning about reparations and
institutional reform:
[R]eparations by government or groups should be aimed at a
restructuring of the institutions and relationships that gave rise to
the underlying justice grievance. Otherwise, as a philosophical
and practical matter, reparations cannot be effective in addressing
root problems of misuse of power, particularly in the maintenance
of oppressive systemic structures, or integrated symbolically into a
group's (or government's) moral foundation for responding to
intergroup conflicts or for urging others to restructure oppressive
relationships. This means that monetary reparations are important,
but not simply as individual compensation. Money is important to
,, 141facilitate the process of personal and community "repair .....
Community repair for Puerto Ricans on the island means the construction of
real political power for themselves and their territory. I have argued in other works
that Puerto Ricans must be able to develop "shared identities' 46 within their own
Accordingly, it is subject to Congressional change. RrVERA-RAMOS, THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION, supra
note 14, at 177-81.
142. There is some internal diversity among commonwealth supporters about exactly what the
commonwealth is or ought to be. Compare ANTONIO FERNOS-ISERN, FILOSOFIA Y DOCTRINA DEL
ESTADOLIBRISMO PUERTORRIQUENO (1996) (a collection of essays written between 1946 and 1973
explaining and defending the current commonwealth status, by one of its principal architects) with TRiAS-
MONGE, OLDEST COLONY, supra note 14, at 195-96 (an architect of the commonwealth refers to
"enhanced commonwealth" as postcolonial alternative).
143. See generally Malavet Cultural Nation, supra note 4, at 98-102.
144. See id., at 75-106 (setting forth requirements for legitimate postcolonial alternatives).
145. Yamamoto, Racial Reparations, supra note 51, at 518.
146. Adeno Addis explains:
By "shared identity" I mean to refer to an identity that bonds together, partially and
contingently, minorities and majorities, such that different cultural and ethnic
groups are seen, and see themselves, as networks of communication where each
group comes to understand its distinctiveness as well as the fact that distinctiveness
is to a large degree defined in terms of its relationship with the Other. Viewed in
this way, the notion of shared identity is not a final state of harmony, as
communitarians would claim. It is rather a process that would allow diverse groups
to link each other in a continuous dialogue with the possibility that the life of each
group will illuminate the conditions of others such that in the process the groups
might develop, however provisionally and contingently, "common vocabularies of
emancipation," and of justice. I think Seyla Benhabib is right when she observed
that "[T]he feelings of friendship and solidarity result ... through the extension of
our moral and political imagination ... through the actual confrontation in public
life with the point of view of those who are otherwise strangers to us but who
become known to us through their public presence as voices and perspectives we
have to take into account."
Addis, supra note 112, at 127 (footnotes omitted) (the notion of shared identity is not a final state of
harmony, as communitarians would claim).
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community as political and cultural citizens of the Republic of Puerto Rico, or within
the United States community, as political citizens of the United States who have
their culture respected by the normative society. 147 To construct Puerto Ricans as
cultural "citizens of the world, 1 48 or even of the United States, would constitute an
imposed homogeneity. This argument implies that Puerto Rican nationalism may be
deployed as a positive force, 149 as long as it is limited by a pluralistic communitarian
consciousness. 150  In this context, Puerto Ricans should be able to choose to be
Puerto Rican patriots. 15' Or, more generally, they should be able to choose a
national affiliation to the independent Republic of Puerto Rico, to the Free
Associated State of Puerto Rico, or to the U.S. State of Puerto Rico.
The keys to a future postcolonial legal relationship between Puerto Rico
and the United States are the preservation of Puerto Rican cultural identity on the
one hand,152 and the grant of full political power to the Puerto Ricans on the other.
Cultural preservation implies resistance to assimilation into an essentialized,
normative U.S. culture. Political power implies that Puerto Ricans will have direct
participation in the political processes of the relevant sovereign authority that
147. See Malavet, Cultural Nation, supra note 4, at 75-106.
148. Martha Nussbaum advocates cosmopolitan citizenship thusly:
The accident of where one is born is just that, an accident; any human being might
have been born in any nation- Recognizing this, [Diogenes'] Stoic successors held
we should not allow differences of nationality or class or ethnic membership or
even gender to erect barriers between us and our fellow human beings. We should
recognize humanity wherever it occurs, and give its fundamental ingredients,
reason and moral capacity, our first allegiance and respect.
Martha C. Nussbaum, Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism, in FOR LoVE OF COUNTRY: DEBATING THE
LIMITS OF PATRIOTISM, MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM WITH RESPONDENTS 7 (Joshua Cohen ed., 1996)
[hereinafter "FOR LovE OF COUNTRY"].
149. Walzer describes this type of nationalism:
The quality of nationalism is also determined within civil society where national
groups coexist and overlap with families and religious communities (two social
formations largely neglected in modernist answers to the question about the good
life) and where nationalism is expressed in schools and movements, organizations
for mutual aid, cultural and historical societies. It is because groups like these are
entangled with other groups, similar in kind but different in aim, that civil society
holds out the hope of a domesticated nationalism. In states dominated by a single
nation, the multiplicity of the groups pluralizes nationalist politics and culture; in
states with more than one nation, the density of the networks prevents radical
polarization.
Michael Walzer, The Civil Society Argument, in THEORIZING CITIZENSHIP, supra note 108, at 166.
150. In other words, nationalism does not have to be inherently fascist. See discussion supra
note 113.
151. Problematizing "patriotism" is one of the basic issues in the citizenship debates. For
example, Martha Nussbaum notes that:
[Richard] Rorty urges Americans, especially the American left, not to disdain
patriotism as a value, and indeed to give central importance to "the emotion of
national pride" and "a sense of shared national identity." Rorty argues that we
cannot even criticize ourselves well unless we also "rejoice" in our American
identity and define ourselves fundamentally in terms of that identity. Rorty seems
to hold that the primary alternative to a politics based on patriotism and national
identity is what he calls a "politics of difference," one based on internal divisions
among America's ethnic, racial, religious, and other subgroups. He nowhere
considers the possibility of a more international basis for political emotion and
concern.
Nussbaum, supra note 148, at 4.
152. This is what I label as the "non-assimilationist" alternatives. Malavet, Cultural Nation,
supra note 4, at 99-102.
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controls Puerto Rico. Under independence, that simply means a democratic
Republic of Puerto Rico with universal suffrage. Under statehood it means the same
level of participation given to any U.S. citizen living in a state: the power to elect a
congressional delegation and to participate in presidential elections. Under
commonwealth, the matter is not entirely clear, but I argue that it requires a type of
sovereignty shared through free association that is equally binding on the United
States and on Puerto Rico; in my view, this can only be accomplished through an
amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 153 But the path to true empowerment for the
Puerto Ricans must also include economic and land reform, as discussed in the next
section.
B. Land and Monetary Reparations
History reveals that one of the estadounidenses' interests in their defeat of
the Spanish in the Spanish-American War was to acquire Puerto Rico's soil.
154
When President McKinley instructed the U.S. delegation that negotiated the Treaty
of Paris, the only full territorial cession that the president ordered them to demand
from the Spanish was that of the islands of Puerto Rico.' 5 5 Since 1898, the United
States has continuously used the island as a military outpost, 156 and appears
153. As I explain in the Cultural Nation article, the legal requirements for independence and
statehood are relatively well known, but the legal requirements for a truly free associated state are more
complex. In my view, FAS status can only be accomplished through a U.S. constitutional amendment.
See Malavet, Cultural Nation, supra note 4, at 96-98, 99-102.
154. This was true from the very conception of the Second Colony, as exemplified by the
following correspondence:
Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt, in a personal letter to Senator
Henry Cabot Lodge, wrote: "... . do not make peace until we get Porto Rico [sic]."
Lodge replied: "Porto Rico [sic] is not forgotten and we mean to have it. Unless I
am utterly . . . mistaken, the administration is now fully committed to the large
policy that we both desire."
THE PUERTO RICANS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 89 (Kal Wagenheim & Olga Jim6nez de Wagenheim
eds., 1994) (emphasis added).
155. Instructions of the President to the United States Peace Commissioners, September 16,
1898, in PAYERS RELATED TO THE TREATY wrH SPAIN [submitted to the U.S. Senate when seeking its
advice and consent] 3, at 4 (1901). These papers were initially secret, but on February 5, 1901, the Senate
lifted the "injunction of secrecy" and ordered the publication of three thousand volumes. Id. at 1. 1 state
"full" cession because the United States did demand the cession of individual islands in the Ladrones and
Philippine archipelagos. Id. at 4, 7 (Guam in the Ladrones, and Luz6n in the Philippines).
156. For example, Roosevelt Roads officially includes the Vieques training area and has three
bays that can accommodate the Navy's largest capital ships, nuclear aircraft carriers. The base covers
37,000 acres on the main island of Puerto Rico and 22,000 acres in Vieques. It has 100 miles of roads and
is occupied by 6000 people, including 2575 Active Military Personnel. It has 200,000 military visitors a
year, and receives 45,000 flights, 1200 ships and 5400 small vessels a year- It houses a communications
complex with five underground levels. The base serves as a staging area for operations in Guanthnamo
and the Panama Canal. It coordinates operations in South American coasts. It hosts joint exercises with
NATO and with the air and naval forces of Central and Latin America. M. MEYN AND J. RODRIGUEZ, EL
APARATO MILITAR NORTEAMERCANO EN PUERTO RICO 38-41 (1982).
Other U.S. bases in Puerto Rico include Ft. Buchanan; Sabana Seca (Sabana Seca
Communications Center, intelligence and espionage); Camp Tortuguero (training center); Salinas
Training Area (training center mainly used by the National Guard). The National Guard, however, uses
additional bases throughout the island; bases are located in Bayam6n, Puerto Nuevo, San Juan, Isla Verde,
Punta Salinas (Toa Baja), Aguadilla, Yauco, Ponce, Salinas, and Caguas. Id . Active-duty U.S. personnel
in Puerto Rico total 3699 (1985 figures). ROBERT E. HARKAVY, BASES ABROAD: THE GLOBAL FOREIGN
PRESENCE 124 (1989). The Aguada Navy Communications base provides a long-range transmitter to
communicate with submerged submarines. Id. at 162. Aguada, Isabella, and Sabana Seca also provide
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especially interested in continuing to do so now for military training and as a
strategically crucial base of operations.
157
Pentagon officials call the Puerto Rican island of Vieques the "only place
its Atlantic fleet can hold simultaneous land, air and sea exercises using live fire."'
158
The United States has 12,375 miles of coastline.1 5 9 When President Clinton declared
that United States coastlines had to be protected in 2000,160 he apparently did not
include all 311161 miles of coastline in Puerto Rico. 162  More importantly, while
Vieques is not geographically irreplaceable, it is most certainly politically
irreplaceable.
163
Notwithstanding the increased dependence on Puerto Rican soil for military
bases and training, the United States has a long history of disregard for the health'6
and dignity of the Puerto Rican people. 165  Since the outset of United States
colonization, it was evident that the United States' interest in conquering land 166 did
not extend to accepting the colonized people as equals. The Treaty of Paris, through
which Spain ceded Puerto Rico to the United States, unlike the Treaty of Guadalupe
for communications with surface combatants. Id. at 163. Puerto Rican bases also provide tracking and
telemetry data for missiles tested from Cape Canaveral. Id. at 263. The Point Borinquen station helps to
monitor solar emissions and their effect on military cormiunications. Id. at 244.
157. In 1982 the U.S. Department of State put it clearly: "[The Caribbean area's] shipping
lanes are vital to U.S. defense and prosperity." One-half of U.S. trade, two-thirds of imported oil, and
many strategic minerals pass through the Panama Canal or the Gulf of Mexico. JAMES N. CORTADA &
JAMES W. CORTADA, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN THE CARIBBEAN, CUBA, AND CENTRAL AMERICA 1 (1985).
See also supra note 139 (the more recent statement by a U.S. general).
158. Despite Protests, Navy Resumes Shelling of Puerto Rican Island, N.Y. TIMES, June 26,
2000, at. A1O.
159. The World Factbook, available at http://www.shopthenet.net/publiclibmry/factbook96/
factbook/us-1.htm (last visited June 24, 2000)_
160. Executive Order No. 13158, May 26, 2000.
161. The World Facthook, available at http://www.odci.gov/cia/pnblications/faetbook/rq.html
(last visited June 24, 2000).
162. Section 2(c) of the Executive Order specifically includes Puerto Rico among the areas in
which "natural and cultural resources within the marine environment" are to be protected. Id. sec. 1.
163. See, e.g., The Pentagon and Vieques, THE WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 22, 1999, at A32
("Chairing a Vieques hearing Tuesday, Sen. John Warner said that, doing their patriotic duty, his own
constituents in Quantico sit closer to an active live-fire range than do residents of Vieques."); Senator
Wamer's statement should be compared to that of Lt. General Tangney, quoted supra in note 139, where
the general indicates that training on Vieques is much more intense than that taking place at any other
training site. Putting the two statements together, we can understand that there are geographic locations in
the United States where such training might take place, but the political viability of it is open to question.
As I personally observed, congressmen in Florida and Texas publicly requested that the Navy move their
training from Vieques to their districts, only to be very quickly and publicly rebuked by their own
constituents and local political leaders.
164. The government has sponsored numerous studies to investigate the use of contraception
medication and sterilization of indigent persons. FEDERICO RIBES TOVAR, THE PUERTO RICAN WOMAN
202-03 (1972).
165. Teddy Roosevelt Jr., who had been appointed governor of the island by President Herbert
Hoover, called the Puerto Ricans "shameless by birth" and added that they did not "know anything more
comic and irritating than Puerto Rico." MORALES CARRION, supra note 14, at 212. Another appointed
governor, Rexford G. Tugwell, later President of the University of Chicago, referred to Puerto Ricans as
"mulatto, Indian, Spanish people" who therefore made "poor material for social organization." Id. at 232.
See also TRUMAN CLARK, PUERTO RiCO AND THE UNITED STATES 1917-1933, 152-53 (1975) (detailing
disturbing and offensive letter written by now-famous late cancer researcher Dr. Cornelius Rhoads
regarding the Puerto Ricans).
166. As to the ight of conquest, see generally Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 8 Wheat.
543 (1822).
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Hidalgo, which ceded conquered Mexican territory, did not guarantee U.S.
citizenship for the inhabitants of Puerto Rico.'67
Reparations will have to include the return of the military lands to Puerto
Ricans, as well as their environmental cleanup. 16 1 Moreover, the Puerto Rican
economy will have to be made to work for Puerto Ricans, not just for U.S. taxpayers
and investors. Currently, Puerto Ricans on the island have a mean per capita income
of less than one-third of the national U.S. average.169  Additionally, they have
received only a fraction of the federal benefits to which any other U.S. citizens are
entitled. 7° Reparations theory can well inform a resolution to these land and
economic problems.
C. Psychological Reparations: The Cure of Information
Perhaps the biggest harm perpetrated by the United States against the
people of Puerto Rico can be labeled "the crisis of self-confidence." This form of
internalized oppression' 7 ' that afflicts the people of Puerto Rico leads them to
167. TREATY Of PARiS, art. IX. See generally Malavet, Cultural Nation, supra note 4, at 24-
25 (studying art. IX of the Treaty of Paris), and 79-83 (comparing art. IX of the Treaty of Paris to art. IX
of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo). This is not to say that they were not interested at all in the people.
The United States wanted consumers, not citizens. See Romin, Empire Forgotten, supra note 14. This
situation is somewhat analogous to the treatment of the Native Americans and other peoples whose lands
were conquered by the United States. In Johnson v. MIntosh, the Supreme Court explained that Native
Americans could not be assimilated, i.e., they could not "be incorporated with the victorious nation, and
become subjects or citizens of the government with which they are connected." Id at 589. Incorporation
was not "practicable," thus requiring the Europeans to choose between "abandoning the country, and
relinquishing their pompous claims to it, or of enforcing those claims by the sword." The Supreme Court
justified genocide as follows:
When the conquest is complete,... the conquered inhabitants can be blended with
the conquerors, or safely governed as a distinct people, ...
But the tribes of Indians inhabiting this country were fierce savages, whose
occupation was war, and whose subsistence was drawn chiefly from the forest. To
leave them in possession of their country, was to leave the country a wilderness; to
govern them as a distinct people, was impossible, because they were as brave and
as high spirited as they were fierce, and were ready to repel by arms every attempt
on their independence.
Id. at 589-90.
168. The U.S. military tested Agent Orange in El Yunque National Rain Forest before using it
in Vietnam. Caribbean News Brief UNITED PRESS INT'L, June 10, 1983, BC cycle. The Navy's training
in Vieques, reportedly, "included the use of napalm and Environmentalists say Vieques' delicate coral
reefs have been largely obliterated. Long stretches of its once-pristine beaches now stand littered with
tons of shrapnel, unexploded shells, discarded military hardware and even the radioactive debris of bombs
that the United States Defense Department now admits were tipped with depleted uranium. Using
uranium-tipped weapons is a direct violation of Pentagon rules." James E. Garcia, The Fate of Vieques,
NEW AM. NEWS SERVICE, May 19, 2000.
169. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
170. See supra note 121.
171. The internalization of oppression occurs when a group that is oppressed by the normative
society replicates some forms of oppression to marginalize members of its own community along lines of
discrimination that parallel those of the normative group. For example, women might be subordinated by
the men within the group, and among African-Americans, lighter skin hues are considered more desirable.
Oliva Espin explains the paradox of a group that is the object of discrimination marginalizing members of
its own community:
The prejudices and racism of the dominant society make the retrenchment into
tradition appear justifiable. Conversely, the rigidities of tradition appear to justify
the racist or prejudicial treatment of the dominant society. These "two mountains"
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conclude that they are incapable of self-government. Under this tragic construct,
Puerto Ricans believe that they lack the economic power to succeed as an
independent nation-that they lack the intellectual and moral capacity for
government. 72 At the same time, Puerto Rico's cultural assertiveness was seen by
the United States as political resistance that had to be stopped. In the process,
independence was constructed as an unacceptable alternative to the United States,
and a disaster for Puerto Ricans.' 73 This resulted in a campaign of cultural 174 and
political repression.
175
The dominant narrative, as reinforced by the United States, carefully
cultivates the view that the people of Puerto Rico, despite their U.S. citizenship, are
too brown, too Latina/o, and too "foreign" 76  too unassimilable-to be
incorporated into the United States. 177  More recently, Puerto Ricans have been
portrayed as "unpatriotic" and "ungrateful" in the public discourses over the release
of Puerto Rican political prisoners, 78 and over the protests of the Navy's use of
Vieques.1 79  In addition to legally constructing Puerto Ricans as second-class
citizens, the United States reinforces this devaluation of Puerto Rican dignity by
using stereotyping narratives about Puerto Rican difference and "otherness" through
a campaign of political repression.
From the Ponce Massacre in 1937,180 where 17 civilians were killed by
police while participating in a nationalist rally, to the murders of Santiago Mari-
Pesqucra, son of independence leader Juan Mari-Bras,' 8' and two pro-independence
reinforce and encourage each other. Moreover, the effects of racism and sexism are
not only felt as pressure from the outside; like all forms of oppression, they become
internalized....
OLIVA W_ ESPiN, WOMEN CROSSING BOUNDARIES: A PSYCHOLOGY OF IMMIGRATION AND
TRANSFORMATION OF SEXUALITY 8 (1999).
172. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
173. Morales Carri6n describes how the Roosevelt Administration approved the filing of "a
bill to offer Puerto Rico its independence in a referendum," but not as an initiative of the administration.
MORALES CARRION, supra note 14, at 235. The expectation among United States officials was that the
dire economic situation prevailing on the island would scare Puerto Ricans away from Independence.
This was accompanied by the trial and conviction of Nationalist Party leader Pedro Albizu Campos, in a
second trial, with a carefully chosen jury. To the surprise of the American officials, even pro-statehood
leaders said that they would vote for independence even if that meant starvation. Id. at 235-36.
174. See Malavet, Cultural Nation, supra note 4, at 67-71 (discussing the failure of the
"Americanization" process of educating Puerto Ricans in English about "American" institutions and
alleged "way of life").
175. See Malavet. Cultural Nation, supra note 4, at 71-74 (discussing the anti-Independence
repression).
176. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
177. Hence, Puerto Rico remains an organized but unincorporated territory of the United
States. Malavet, Cultural Nation, supra note 4.
178. See supra notes 130-134 and accompanying text.
179. See, e.g., Statement by Senator Warner, supra note 163.
180. On Palm Sunday, March 31, 1937, the pro-independence Puerto Rico Nationalist Party
marched through the streets of Ponce. The mayor had initially granted a permit for the march, but had
tried to rescind it at the last minute after Governor Blanton "Winship ordered the chief of police, Colonel
Orbeta, to tell the mayor" to do so. After a shot of"undetermined origin," the police fired into the crowd.
Nineteen were killed, including two policemen. "A later inquiry by the American Civil Liberties Union
concluded that there had been a 'gross violation of civil rights and incredible police brutality."' MORALES
CARRION, at 238. My grandmother, Otilia Vega Ruiz, then pregnant, was shopping in downtown Ponce
on that date. She had to run for her life. Luckily for me, she survived, since the child of this pregnancy
was my father-
181. Santiago Mari-Pesquera was the young son of Puerto Rico Socialist Party leader Juan
Mari-Bras. He was murdered by a person who is known to have been a paid FBI informant. When Don
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activists by police on the Cerro Maravilla 82 (and their official cover-up),1 8 3 there has
been a history of political violence directed at pro-independence forces in Puerto
Rico. 84 The violence, the application of the Little Smith Act, 185 and the "subversive
files" are the best examples of generalized anti-independence repression.
Persons were deemed to be "subversivos" (subversives) simply because
they favored the independence of Puerto Rico. Accordingly, the term subversivo-
in its correct meaning identifying legitimate political activists illegally targeted by
government misconduct-was thrust into the legal consciousness of all Puerto
Ricans by the Puerto Rican Supreme Court decision in Noriega-Rodriguez v.
Hernandez-Col6n.'5 6 In that case, the Court held that the practice of opening police
files to investigate persons solely on the basis of their political views and legal
activities was unconstitutional. The Court ordered that the existing files be turned
over to those persons on whom the files were kept.'
8 7
Juan went to collect his subversive carpeta, several boxes worth, he found that all the documents
accumulated during the period of his son's murder had been removed, apparently by the FBI. The murder
is mentioned in passim in EL ASESINATO POLiTICO EN PUERTO Rico ii (Yvonne Acosta Lespier ed.,
1998). Mari-Bras was the plaintiff who renounced his U.S. citizenship and claimed Puerto Rican
citizenship in the case described in note 7 supra.
182. On July 25, 1978, at the Cerro Maravilla, Carlos Soto Arrivi and Ruben Dario Rosado
were murdered by the Puerto Rico Police, reportedly while FBI agents waited some distance away. (In
hearings before the Puerto Rico Senate, witnesses testified that FBI agents were in the vicinity of the
Cerro Maravilla on the date of the murders) A few minutes after the ill-fated independentistas were taken
by the police, a reportedly elated Governor Carlos Romero Barcel6 announced during a Commonwealth
Day celebration that a "terrorist attack" on the Cerro Maravilla had been beaten back by police. MANUEL
SUAREZ, REQUIEM ON CERRO MARAVILLA: THE POLICE MURDERS IN PUERTO R!CO AND THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT COVERUP 74 (1987).
183. The administration of Nobel-Laureate James P. Carter, former President of the United
States, who is now known as a champion of civil and human rights, is alleged to have participated in the
cover-up, in exchange for primary votes. The basic allegation is that Carter, then embroiled in a tight
contest for the Democratic presidential nomination with Edward Kennedy, wanted Puerto Rico's 41
Democratic convention delegates. "In December 1979, it is known, Romero [Carlos Romero Barcel6,
then governor of Puerto Rico] met with then President Jimmy Carter and Attorney General Benjamin
Civiletti. Shortly thereafter, Romero, who had previously backed Republicans, endorsed Carter in his
primary election race against Sen. Edward Kennedy." Diana Maychick, On Film: Film as Expose, THE
RECORD, May 6, 1990, at El (reviewing the movie "A Show of Force"). See also ANNE NELSON,
MURDER UNDER TWO FLAGS: THE U.S., PUERTO RICO, AND THE CERRO MARAVILLA COVER Up (1986).
Mr. Carter received the votes of 21 of the 41 delegates during the March 1980 primary. See generally
SUAREZ, REQUIEM ON CERRO MARAVILLA, supra note 182, at 127-53.
184. To be fair, nationalists did engage in violence of their own, particularly the 1950
nationalist revolt in Puerto Rico. On "March 1, 1954: Four Puerto Rican nationalists fire 30 shots from
the U.S. House visitors' gallery, wounding five congressmen. Nov. 1, 1950: Two Puerto Ricans, Griselio
Torresola and Oscar Collazo, attempt to assassinate President Harry S. Truman at Blair House in
Washington. Torresola is killed and his partner and three police officers are wounded." Blast Rips World
Trade Center in N. Y: 5 Dead, Hundreds Hurt, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1993, at Al (includes a timeline of
attacks tied to Puerto Rican nationalists). Nevertheless, for anyone keeping score, the record of violence
and persecution clearly puts independence supporters as the victims of United States imperialism. See
generally EL ASESINATO POLTICO EN PUERTO Rico (Yvonne Acosta Lespier ed., 1998).
185. Law 53 of June 10, 1948, was known in Puerto Rico as La Ley de La Mordaza. See
People v. Burgos, 75 DPR 535 (1953) (the Ley de La Mordaza was constitutional under both the Puerto
Rico and United States Constitutions and it had not been preempted by the Smith Act.) On the Smith Act,
see Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956). (Federal Smith Act, 18 USC § 2385 [1999], imposing
criminal liability on anyone who "advocates, abets, advises, or teaches... overthrowing or destroying the
government of the United States or the government of any State, Territory, District or Possession thereof'
preempts state laws.).
186. 122 P.R. DEC. 650 (1988).
187. The court appointed a special master to take control of the files and instructed him to turn
them over to their objects. 122 P.R. DEC. 650 (1988). See also Noriega-Rodriguez v. Hemandez-Col6n,
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The Puerto Rican Supreme Court's approach differed substantially from
that of the U.S. Supreme Court, which did not find anything wrong with this kind of
governmental political "data gathering."'188 Accordingly, U.S. intclligencc agencies,
some of which were not chartered for domestic investigations, were heavily involved
in Puerto Rico. 8 9 The FBI, for example, dedicated most of its agents in Puerto Rico
not to investigating bank robberies and other crimes, but to follow independentistas
(independence supporters), and to attempt to sabotage the movement. 90
Economic reparations are part of the solution to the crisis of self-confidence
generated by the U.S. representation of the Puerto Ricans' 9' and the acts of political
repression briefly described above. But perhaps even more important than money is
a full disclosure by the government of the United States of the benefits that it has
derived from the century-old U.S.-Puerto Rico relationship, both in the private and
public economies. This is essential in undoing the myth of Puerto Rico as a
dependent U.S. welfare-state that only drains the U.S. economy.
Moreover, full disclosure of the political repression the United States has
perpetrated and encouraged is also required, with specific mention of the anti-
130 P.R. DEC. 919, 92 JTS 85 (1992) (the files could not be edited to remove the names of undercover
agents or other informants before being turned over). Puerto Rico Governor Pedro Rossello issued an
executive order authorizing the payment of a small damage award to persons whose files exceeded 30
pages. I have had the opportunity to examine several carpetas. My father's was file number 31336; it
had 60 pages. (Carpeta No. 31336, copy on file with the author). My godfather's carpeta consists of 543
pages. (Carpeta No. 9296, copy on file with the author). My friend Mario Edmundo V6lez's was No.
24844 (247 pages, copy on file with the author).
188. See Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 351 U.S. 115 (1956)
(Smith Act activities against the communist party not held unconstitutional); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1;
92 S. Ct. 2318; 33 L. Ed. 2d 154 (1972) (existence of "data gathering system" in which the Pentagon
created files on persons it deemed dangerous-mostly anti-Vietnam War protesters-did not unduly chill
the files' objects First Amendment rights). McCarthyism a la Puerto Rico, however, was a search for
independentistas.
189. One clear example is the FBI's COINTELPRO operation. In addition, documentary
evidence indicates that the United States Secret Service, the Department of State, the Central Intelligence
Agency (which is not chartered for "domestic" espionage), the Office of Naval Intelligence, and the ACSI
have likewise engaged in covert domestic espionage activities. See Carmen Gautier Mayoral & Teresa
Blanco Stahl, COINTELPRO en Puerto Rico: Documentos Secretos del FBI (1960-1971), in LAS
CARPETAS: PERSECUCION POLITICA Y DERECHOS CIVILES EN PUERTO RICO 255-97 (Ram6n Bosque Pdrez
& Jose Javier Col6n Morera eds., 1997).
190. See, e.g., SuAi.Ez, at 348-50. Suirez details operations around the 1968 elections in
Puerto Rico, for example. He indicates that FBI agents spent a great deal of their time keeping tabs on the
Pro-independence movement. They even faked political messages, attributed to different segments of the
movement, in order to cause discord. One example was the attempt to argue that Juan Mari Bras, a
socialist party leader, was having an affair with the wife of an independence leader. Id. The history of
intelligence-gathering on Puerto Rico's dissenters is long. During the First World War, the War
Department created the Military Intelligence Division (MID). MID was divided into two divisions: The
first, called the "Positive Branch .... collected information on military, political, economic, and social
condition; and [the second] the Negative Branch, which investigated and suppressed sabotage and
espionage." In Puerto Rico, MID shifted its focus from alien enemies to political dissenters and the
"intelligence officer for the district simply took over the insular police force of eight hundred men." JOAN
M. JENSES, ARMY SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA, 1775-1980, 172 (1991).
191. Keith Aoki describes this type of symbolic (semiotic) RE-presentation as "a series of acts
involving[] re-creation, interpretation and meaning-making". Keith Aoki, (Re)Presenting Representation,
2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 247, 261 (1997). While in this case it is being used against the Puerto Ricans,
Aoki argues that political semiotic Re-presentation can be used to subvert existing power hegemonies. Id.
at 262 n.34 and accompanying text (while political Representation, like artistic representation, can have
both mimetic and semiotic aspects to it, Aoki argues that a progressive, postmodern LatCrit scholar
should favor Symbolic, semiotic Political RE/presentation as a way of challenging the status quo,
entrenched power normativities.).
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independence violence and police-state tactics that target any political dissent that
the United States chooses to label as "anti-American." The distinction between
public enemy and political opponent is especially important in the post-September
11 United States. Once a full disclosure is made, the Puerto Ricans can be in a




Puerto Rico's colonial relationship to the United States has lasted from the
days of President William McKinley at the dawn of the twentieth century, to the post
9-11 days of the twenty-first-century administration of President George W. Bush. I
find it utterly astonishing that this one-hundred-year-old colonial captivity endures.
To the extent that the United States holds absolute legal/political power over the
island and the people of Puerto Rico, the only explanation is that the colonialists are
still invested in their colony; and post 9-11 conditions make them only more
aggressive and intransigent in the exercise of that colonial power.
In contrast, the second century of the United States colony in Puerto Rico
had started on a few hopeful notes. The year 2000, for me, was marked by the
"Latin Music Craze," in which Latina/o artists (many of them Puerto Ricans),
became the darlings of MTV and of U.S. mass media.' 93 More importantly, during
2001, prior to the tragedies of September 11, the Puerto Ricans progressed from
singing and dancing to exercising their legitimate right to political activism, in the
collective U.S. mind. The protests over the use of Vieques as a training site for the
U.S. Navy became the most common public image of the Puerto Ricans in U.S. mass
media. This was a terrific example of using a new public visibility and
consciousness to subvert existing power hegemonies.
But, unfortunately, the Vieques protests by the Puerto Ricans soon proved
the limitations of having to work within a normative culture in which there are the
legal and cultural "others". As long as it remained entertaining, in a manner that
esladounidenses found alluring, Puerto Rican visibility was acceptable. But as soon
as the message became political, the backlash was quick to follow. Now, the finest
moment in Puerto Rican patriotism' 94 during the U.S. colony is being presented
192. 1 am personally not very interested in an apology, just in the undoing of the effects of
imperialism. Nevertheless, apology can be an important type of reparation. See, e.g., Yamamoto, Racial
Reparations, supra note 51, at 518 n. 173 and accompanying text (a recipient of reparations to Japanese-
Americans noting the importance of symbolic payment and government apology).
193. See generally Malavet, Accidental Crit 11, supra note 13; Steven W. Bender, Will The
Wolf Survive?: Latinola Pop Music in the Cultural Mainstream, 78 DENV. U. L. REv. 719 (2001); Nancy
Ehrenreich, Confessions of a White Salsa Dancer: Issues of Appropriation, Appreciation, and Identity in
the "Latin Music Craze, " 78 DENv. U. L. REV. 795 (2001).
194. The debate over the use of Vieques is about citizenship and patriotism, but not in the
manner in which it is constructed by the normative powers within the United States. Rather, Puerto Rican
patriots who believe in their own nation are protecting their right to control their own land. Additionally,
the many Puerto Ricans who believe in a permanent relationship with the United States, who embrace
their U.S. citizenship and who also oppose the bombing, are being American patriots as well. They are
challenging "bombing without representation" and demanding that their rights as U.S. citizens and as
human beings be respected by the colonizer. In fact, they are demanding that the United States live up to
the rhetoric of democracy in its treatment of its own citizens.
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through the lens of U.S. politicians who feel free to misrepresent the status of the
Puerto Ricans for their own political needs.
1 95
Before September 11, 2001, 1 had allowed myself to become cautiously
optimistic about the end of Puerto Rico's colonial status. After all, the interests
appeared to be converging and U.S. uses of Puerto Rico seemed to be waning.
1 96
The army had announced the transfer of important military operations away from
Puerto Rico,' 97 and President George W. Bush had stated that he intended to close
the Vieques training center in early 2003.198
But, thereafter, the Congress passed legislation prohibiting the closing of
the training range, 199 and the Secretary of Defense has indicated that they intend to
stay.2tt  The public/military use of Puerto Rico will continue20 1 and the private
economic benefits derived by U.S. companies through their Puerto Rico operations
still exist. Therefore, Puerto Rico continues to represent a net private profit and an
essential site for public affairs for the U.S. imperialists. Puerto Rican independence
is thus not acceptable to the United States. Moreover, the democratic deficit in the
195. See Statement by Senator Warner, supra note 163.
196. 1 was therefore looking forward to the application of Derrick Bell's interest-convergence
thesis: "Bell's thesis suggests that dominant groups only recognize 'rights' of minorities when the
recognition of those rights benefits the dominant group's larger interests. That is, a government will
rarely simply do the right hing; rather, it is likely to confer reparations only at a time and in a manner that
furthers the interest of those in political power." Yamamoto, Racial Reparations, supra note 51, at 497.
197. See, e.g., Josd A. Delgado, Vieques No Tuvo Nada Que Ver [Vieques Had Nothing to Do
with It], EL NUEVO DiA, Sept. 29, 2002, (copy on file with author) (reporting that the move of Southern
Army Command from Puerto Rico to Texas, announced some months ago, will be completed by July of
2003).
198. See Ivan Roman and Tamara Lytle, Lawmakers Kill Vieques Deal: The Pentagon, Not
Islanders, Won the Right to Decide if the Navy Stops Target Practice, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Dec. 13,
2001, at A10 (reporting that President Bush had committed to leaving the island by May of 2003, thus
complying with deals reached by the Clinton Administration with the Pro-statehood governor of Puerto
Rico, Pedro Rossello; but Congress passed legislation forbidding the Navy from leaving until "an
adequate replacement" for the training site could be found). See also Esther Sehrader & Paul Richter,
Political Pressure Helped Vieques Avert Cross Hairs, L.A. TiMEs, June 15, 2001, at Al.
199. See National Defense Authorization Act for FY2002, Sec. 1049(a), 107 P.L. 107; 115
Stat. 1012 (Dec. 28 2001) ("The Secretary of the Navy may close the Vieques Naval Training Range on
the island of Vieques, Puerto Rico, and discontinue training at that range only if the Secretary certifies to
the President and Congress that both of the following conditions are satisfied: (1) One or more alternative
training facilities exist ... [and] (2) The alternative facility or facilities are available and fully capable of
supporting such Navy and Marine Corps training immediately upon cessation of training on Vieques.").
200. During a news briefing on September 16, 2002, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld
stated, in partial answer to a question, that: "Vieques is an important location for us, and we intend to
continue to operate on a basis that's consistent with our obligations, and we hope others will continue to
cooperate in a manner that's consistent with their obligations." Available at http://www.defenselink.mil/
news/Sep2002/t09162002_tO9l6sd.html (last visited October 1, 2002; copy on file with author). But see
infra note 201.
201. This would be true even if the Vieques training center is closed. However, the most
recent developments reported in Puerto Rico have reiterated that the president wishes to close the training
center. Following the disclosure that the military had conducted chemical training on Vieques, published
reports in Puerto Rico stated that the U.S. military would leave the Vieques training center in May of
2003. See Matthew Hay Brown, Navy to Leave Vieques, Calder6n Says, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Oct. 19,
2002, at A23; La Marina confirma el anuncio hecho par Calder6n, EL NUEVO DiA, Oct. 19, 2002
(reporting that a White House spokesperson had confirmed that the Navy would close the training area as
announced by Puerto Rico governor Sila Maria Calder6n) (copy of the story as published in the
newspaper's website on file with author); see also Nancy San Martin, Chemical Testing a Smoking Gun
for Vieques Protests, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 18, 2002, Domestic News. Given that this supposed closure
has been heard of before, I will take the attitude of "Santo Tombs" (St. Thomas): I will believe it when I
see it.
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U.S.-Puerto Rico relationship leaves the Puerto Ricans politically powerless to
protect their own interests. Despite U.S. citizenship and federal control of their
island, Puerto Ricans are a racialized "other" unacceptable for full citizenship rights
in the United States.
This sad state of affairs makes it even more important to develop coherent
legal theories that might help to empower the marginalized, colonized Puerto Ricans.
Reparations theory, as a guide for implementing a court-ordered decolonization of
the island, may be one of the most powerful tools in the execution of LatCritical
praxis2°2 to end the occupation of mi Isla del Encanto, my Enchanted Isle of Puerto
Rico.
202. Francisco Vald6s has written about Praxis in the LatCrit enterprise:
Following from the recognition that all legal scholarship is political is that LatCrit
scholars must conceive of ourselves as activists both within and outside our
institutions and professions. Time and again, the authors urge that praxis must be
integral to LatCrit projects because it ensures both the grounding and potency of the
theory. Praxis provides a framework for organizing our professional time, energy
and activities in holistic ways. Praxis, in short, can help cohere our roles as
teachers, scholars and activists. The proactive embrace of praxis as organic in all
areas of our professional lives thus emerges as elemental to the initial conception of
LatCrit theory. Praxis therefore serves as the second LatCrit guidepost.
Vald6s, Poised at the Cusp, supra note 29, at 1.
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